Quote from: TPTB_need_war on February 16, 2016, 09:22:52 AM

Quote from: monsterer on February 16, 2016, 09:06:25 AM

Quote from: TPTB_need_war on February 16, 2016, 05:30:47 AM

In fact, I do believe that perhaps the same Nash equilibrium failure that applies to scripting (as stated above) may apply in the cross-partition design for asset transfers because there is a cascade of history. I need to think about this more. I will try to remember to comment on this point later.

I've touched on this before, but you've reminded me again; partitions are the antithesis of consensus. Taking things to the extreme is helpful to illustrate the problem: with infinite partitions, in bitcoin, you are left with the DAG of the UTXO set, and no blocks or any agreement on what the order of transactions should be, in other words, no consensus. The LCR in bitcoin constantly forces miners to chose between candidate potential partitions (orphan chains). The nash equilibrium results in rational miners always choosing the longest branch to mine on to maximise their profits.

More completely stated, the Nash equilibrium is that there is no other strategy other than the strategy of mining on the longest chain which is visible to all nodes, i.e. that there is no superior strategy other than the one that nodes are already doing and which is known to all nodes. Whereas, as I pointed out in my video, when a node (or colluding nodes) have > 33% of the hashrate, then for Satoshi' PoW design they can apply the selfish mining attack by withholding block solutions until the rest of the network catches up, thus the Nash equilibrium is destroyed by selfish mining in that case.

Also I have pointed out in my video and the follow up posts in this thread about a meta issue that destroys the Nash equilibrirum, that for the case where there are external failures (external to the block chain's perspective of itself) due to external actuation of cross-partition state (even if the block chain thinks it is enforcing a strict partitioning with no cross partition state), the Nash equilibrium fails because the entire coin fails, thus the validators of partitions can't trust the validators of other partitions (because although they get their block reward, the external market value of the reward fails). It remains under study whether this applies to asset transfers too (or just to partitioning of scripts) and whether it applies for asset transfers in the strict partitioning block chain (which I argued in my video is immune to the problem) and/or in the cross-partitioning block chain (which I did not address in my video and Fuserleer raised this point hence).

I hope readers don't get confused that I am making a distinction between when cross partitioned state is occurring by-design on the block chain and when it occurs externally because it can. For scripting it is impossible to enforce a strict partitioning because it is very clear that the external actuation can inject state from one partition into another partition (and even though the block chain can't determine this, the external users can and the external users can experience failure that the block chain is entirely unaware of due to this external Turing completeness, which is a very deep, meta, high IQ concept that apparently most people wouldn't think of ... note smooth indicated to me in a PM that he had thought of this issue of external Turing completeness before too). For asset transfers (no scripting), it is not yet 100% clear to me. I need to think about it more.

Quote from: monsterer on February 16, 2016, 09:06:25 AM

Talking about partition unification for a moment; if two partitions are totally separate, merging them doesn't have any consequences for ordering because the individual transactions in each partition have been separate from each other, you can order them however you like as long as you obey the parent/child relationship in each partition.

Yes as long as the state from the two partitions did not leak into each other by any means (including the external meta case mentioned again above).

Following up on that bolded commitment quoted above, cross-partition transactions even with asset transfers (e.g. a crypto currency, not scriptable block chains) seems to destroy the Nash equilibrium also, because the cascade of derivative transactions infects across partitions, yet the validators did not validate all partitions (i.e. not all transactions). Thus later if it is discovered that a partition lied about a transaction being valid, then downstream transactions in other partitions would invalidated (i.e. reverted). Which would of course cause the coin to be considered a failure and market price plummet. So it is the same as the case of strict partitioning with scripting.

Thus I have no idea what Fuserleer is doing for eMunie that might possibly work soundly. I will have to wait for his white paper.

In my design, I have cross-partition transactions, but the way I accomplish this and maintain the Nash equilibrium is I entirely centralized verification, i.e. all transactions are validated by all centralized validators. This eliminates the problem that full nodes have unequal incomes but equal verification costs, thus ameliorates the economics that drives full nodes to become centralized. The centralized validators would still have the potential incentive to lie and short the coin. So the users in the system (hopefully millions of them) are constantly verifying a subsample of the transactions so that statistically a centralized validator is going to get caught fairly quickly, banned, and their hard won reputation entirely blown. Since these validations are done in a non-organized manner (i.e. they are randomly chosen by each node), then there is no viable concept of colluding to maintain a lie.

In case anyone has forgotten, I believe I have convincingly shown that it is impossible to design a consensus algorithm that will not centralize verification (if not also mining control in Satoshi's PoW and in PoS). So at least my design maintains decentralized control, while centralizing verification while also statistically decentralized checking the verification for lies.

Quote from: TPTB_need_war on January 09, 2016, 04:22:16 PM

For example, imagine that a million users are earning a good income doing business based in permissionless commerce the government would like to eliminate (such as the Big Pharma corruption I exampled upthread), and so they fork away from the masses's block chain when the governments is able to use their control of Coinbase et al (imagine a world government level of cooperation).

So then everyone can spend their coins on both forks. If there is this genuine Coasian barrier that forces the existence of a second fork, then the government can play Whack-A-Mole until they realize that the masses are catching on to the opportunities of freedom and individual empowerment.

The point being that doing such a fork would be nearly infeasible in Satoshi's design because all those who move in mass action are not going to be supplying PoW mining in Satoshi's design (thus the new fork can be easily attacked). The economics are not conducive in Satoshi's design for maintaining the fight for permissionless commerce.

This is the sort of ideal I want to work on! If I can be convinced I am not working on bullshit, I will be more inspired.

Quote from: patmast3r on January 09, 2016, 03:41:41 PM

I think miners insterests are more aligned with users interests than you think. Afterall if the currency they are mining becomes worthless their operation becomes worthless as well. So anything that hurts the value of their currency is neither in the interest of the miners nore in the interest of users. Of course there are other subjects where their interests do not align.

The professional miners' are aligned to paying back the loans they incurred to buy mining farms. Frankly I think your post is delusional. Get a grip on economics. Usury (debt) enables the banksters to take entire control of the economics of mining and charge the costs to the collective.

This is the fairytale lies crap that leads so many of us to be ideological fools. I want to kill this. I am so tired of these lies.

I hope you realize that the per BTC costs of some of the mining farms running off 2 - 4 cent electricity in WA State, USA, are probably sub-$50 per BTC.

And by aligning with government edicts and takeover which the dumb masses (and socialism) will be on board with, they are not shooting their own foot, rather maximizing the sustainability of their income source.

Sorry if I am so forceful, but I have heard these sort of rationalizations for the past 3 years and I think it is time we stop being delusional, don't you?