Quote from: rezilient on March 13, 2016, 05:47:41 AM

Quote from: Bubba-Gump on March 13, 2016, 04:41:30 AM

-Snip-

Just face it, its impossible.

No one has made any statement that remotely proved the impossibility of control by a mere plurality of the vote. I'm not talking about a plurality of all the LISK in existence. I'm talking about a plurality of the vote.

Quote from: MalReynolds on March 13, 2016, 05:01:50 AM

The balance in a voting account is not split among the people who that account votes for. Everybody that person votes for gets the full balance of the voting account added into their vote total from all other accounts.

Yes, the whole network could be controlled by someone who holds a majority of Lisk. This is equivalent to a 51% percent mining attack in Bitcoin.

Max, please correct me if what I have said here is wrong. Also, please edit the phrase in red above to "At launch this 1% of votes would be 1,000,000 LISK (later more, due to inflation) or 100,000,000,000,000 votes." This change helps to clarify the big numbers are referring to "1%" and not "all LISK in the network". I was a little confused the first time I read this.

The part in red is not the problem. The problem is that in delegate staking, control can be owned by someone who has a plurality of the vote. Not "majority of LISK" or "majority of vote", but mere plurality of the vote.

You can explain to me how it works all day long, but this is the weakest type of block chain security ever conceived.

Security is a property of the protocol. The delegated staking protocol does not provide security from a "plurality attack". I've shown this is the case by giving the example of an entity that holds a plurality of the vote, voting for each of it's delegates with a plurality of the vote and winning every one. Show me what in the protocol prevents this from happening.

I agree that 51% attacks are possible with other security systems. In comparison to those however, LISK is much weaker.