Quote from: TPTB_need_war on April 19, 2016, 05:33:07 PM

Regarding the future of Bitcoin and its Tragedy of the Commons economic design:

Quote from: ArticMine on April 19, 2016, 04:54:28 PM

At best one would see the type of cartel that TPTB_need_war has suggested; however my take is that this kind of cartel would only last for a short time before collapsing. Just witness what is currently happening in the crude oil market.

Cartels form in power vacuums. They must align with the greater power vacuums in order to sustain their market inefficiency (top-down control can't anneal maximum fitness). So the only way such a cartel would not fail, would be to become a fiat of the world government and be sustained by the Iron Law on Political Economics which is the perennial, inimitable power vacuum.

Quote from: TPTB_need_war on April 19, 2016, 06:35:14 PM

Quote from: vlom on April 19, 2016, 06:15:55 PM

the only question that matters: block size!

No the only longer-term question that matters is the minimum transaction fee, since that determines the block size. Note that while transaction fees are much less than coinbase rewards, then miners might include any transaction without even a fee for Nash equilibrium reasons.

Quote from: TPTB_need_war on April 19, 2016, 07:36:18 PM

The solution to the block size problem has nothing to do with controlling the size of the blocks. It requires a different design where transaction fees trend near to costs but not to costs, thus not making the nodes of the system bankrupt.

Quote from: TPTB_need_war on April 19, 2016, 11:13:56 PM

Quote from: ArticMine on April 19, 2016, 09:11:17 PM

This brings us back to the Cryptonote adaptive blocksize limit combined with a tail emission found in Monero where:
1) The cost of mining a block is set by the block subsidy

Correct, meaning the amount of hashrate miners spend will be equal to the block subsidy[1] (where block subsidy will ultimately be Monero's perpetual tail reward which is necessarily a fixed # of coins), because (as I pointed out in our prior discussion) transaction fees will trend to costs, due to that the median block size M_N will trend upwards to match market demand and thus there is no pricing power on transaction fees.

[1] Note this means the tail reward security of Monero will be very weak and insufficient.

Quote from: ArticMine on April 19, 2016, 09:11:17 PM

2) The total amount in fees per block has to rise to a number comparable to, but most of the time smaller, than the block subsidy.

You wrote that before in our prior discussion:

Quote from: ArticMine on February 10, 2016, 10:44:58 PM

The reason the above two scenarios do not apply to a Cryptonote coin with a tail emission such a Monero becomes apparent when one considers the economics of the total block reward components of fees and base reward (new coin emission). If the total in fees per block significantly exceed the base reward then it becomes economically attractive for miners to burn coins to the penalty by mining larger blocks. The block size rises until the total fees per block fall below a level where it is uneconomic for the miners to pay the penalty by increasing the blocksize. This level is comparable to the base reward. It is at this point where the need for a tail emission becomes clear, since without the tail emission the total block reward (fee plus base reward) would go to zero.

And it still doesn't make any sense to me. The block size will trend upwards to match transaction demand, because the penalty is driven to 0 as the median block size increases as miners can justify burning some of the transaction fees to the penalty. That drives the median block size upwards, which drives the penalty to 0 again. The median block size doesn't have any incentive to decrease again, thus transaction fees then fall to costs.

Sorry as I told you before, Monero does not solve the Tragedy of the Commons in Satoshi's design. It does adaptively increase the block size while preventing spam surges.

I doubt John Conner's design has achieved any better, because as I explained at our prior discussion, there is no decentralized solution to that Tragedy of the Commons in the current proof-of-work designs. I have a solution, but it is a very radical change to the proof-of-work design that relies on unprofitable mining by payers.