Quote from: Macrochip on February 10, 2017, 09:01:39 PM

I concur. The disgusting and vicious lie that Evan supposedly "lied" about not launching the coin and then launched it without announcement anyway is especially pathetic when all you have to do is scroll down to see him clearly announce the launch beforehand to anyone interested. Argument from butthurt: Confirmed!

I've seen the same Manuro hater lie-tactic perpetuated in another instance where they said the client didn't compile "intentionally" so that Evan had an unfair advantage when just 2 posts later the person complaining admitted he made a mistake and it was his own fault. Of course this was misleadingly and fraudulently omitted by our failing detractors.
Just like they omitted the fact that their shitcoin was cripplemined -provably intentionally- and was therefore launched as a criminal scam defrauding naive investors.

Great job, Tao!

i have a better angle (and topic) at looking at the instamine stuff..

how about..."masternodes concept/idea/plan" was secretly hidden from the public's eye for 1 month by Evan and co . before launching the coin and a month after the instamine.

that's right, the one you guys are non-stop posting like on every page on this thread "MASTERNODES" Grin

check the dates Wink

Quote from: arielbit on September 01, 2016, 03:16:56 PM

this will give you folks a different angle on the instamine (crosspost from why dash instamine matters thread)

dash's first month

Quote from: arielbit on August 18, 2016, 04:41:34 PM

Quote from: aleix on August 18, 2016, 02:42:43 PM

Quote from: arielbit on August 18, 2016, 02:31:27 PM

Quote from: dinofelis on August 18, 2016, 01:44:01 PM

Quote from: toknormal on August 18, 2016, 01:02:33 PM

Quote from: bbc.reporter on August 18, 2016, 05:30:51 AM

Ok I get it now. So it is no good. But can anyone explain why the price is rising?

It's rising because it's one of the most coherent monetary assets on coinmarketcap, being that it retains bitcoin's blokchain transparency while improving massively on its fungibility to the point that distinguishing characteristics between addresses are effectively eliminated.

Further, Dash has established a balanced approach between reserve and currency markets thats almost unmatched by any other cryptocurrency asset. That's to say that while some proportion of the coin supply is made available by holders on exchanges for trading, a significant proportion of the rest of it is deployed on the network and earns a return for its holders.

This is in fact not really true. The coins held in Master nodes are not production investment that earns interest as in a normal currency reserve system, where "saving" is in fact (delegated) investment in production capital. In other words, "saved" money in a normal monetary economy are not "put in a box" but are again actively used by entrepreneurs to buy production capital. That money keeps flowing, in other words, it is not locked up in a box as is the case in a Master node.

The "interest earning" in Master nodes is nothing else but a re-distribution of seigniorage by mining ; in other words, a tax on every currency holder, that goes in the pockets of Master node holders: a transfer of wealth from active users to "passive possessors".

In a normal economy, the interest earned comes from the risk taken. A master node locked up doesn't take the slightest bit of risk but earns 45% of the seigniorage.

You can say that in bitcoin too, there is inflation because of mining. However, because in bitcoin, the full seigniorage goes to the miner, that miner will also be pushed by competition to BURN most of the seigniorage in PoW. In DASH, because the miner will only receive 45% of the seigniorage, competition will only make him burn 45% of the seigniorage in PoW, and the rest goes in the pockets of Master nodes and the "gouvernors". Now, that is EXTREMELY SIMILAR to central banking and their interest rates on issued currency feeding a whole bunch of elite with free money, taxed by inflation on all the others.

In bitcoin, at least, this "tax" is entirely (or almost entirely) burned by PoW, so there is not really a self-accumulation of wealth without risk by the "richies of the first hour(s)".

Also because of this lucrative locking up of a large part of the money supply in master nodes, the ACTUAL available market cap of DASH is way lower than is calculated, because the available coin supply is seriously lower than the total number of coins existing.

But all this is not to point out that DASH is a kind of rip off. There is simply no other way to do some form of automated secured coinjoin mixing with bitcoin technology: you need "trusted parties", and so you need to provide them with sufficient incentive to do so (the master nodes). This implies re-centralisation, governance, and hence, taxes and lucrative happenings for the elite which get richer.

The remaining question is how many master nodes are under independent control. If that number is too small, then the anonymity of the mixing becomes compromised too.

masternodes are already in plan even before they launched dash....hence the importance of the instamine to grab an astounding amount of dash

This is another lie (a lie you like to repeat again and again). I know because I was there.

Anyone can read the Dash thread from day one to check.

here goes... get ready for some ass whoopin! and check the dates

Quote from: eduffield on January 20, 2014, 10:15:41 PM

Great, now that everything is stable, I'll be posting later about the vision of this project and milestones! Time to move on to actually implementing what I set out to do.

this is posted after the 48hr instamine

ka ching! Evan and his friends pocketed a lot of coins.... great indeed very great Evan *clap* *clap*

aaaaannd before he posted this (quote below)

Evan already forked DASH from 84 Million supply to about 21 Million

and you can see him posting, WTB 20,000 and WTB 10,000 DASH <------ the greed of this guy knows no boundary Grin

and then this! (the vision of this project and milestones)

Quote from: eduffield on February 21, 2014, 03:22:54 PM

In reply to: http://www.reddit.com/r/DRKCoin/comments/1yit1a/using_coinjoin_for_anonymity_is_errorprone/

I'm posting this here, for everyone's benefit. Thanks!

Quote

Hi, I am Gnosis, the Anoncoin developer working on implementing Zerocoin. First of all, I think it is excellent that there is so much interest in developing a fully anonymous currency. I am not just a developer but also a user, or I will be when an anonymous currency exists! When coin creators compete, the coin users win!
However, CoinJoin has been around for a while, and it has not seen much use for anonymity. There's a good reason for that: it's not very anonymous.
Quoting my bitcointalk post:

Quote

CoinJoin has questionable anonymity compared to Zerocoin. The reason is that with CoinJoin, two or more users must somehow partner up and forge a transaction together. They communicate over a secure channel to do this. The coins are only mixed among these "partners." Picking partners you can trust is a significant obstacle: how can you know that your partners will "forget" the mixing that happened? One may try to repeat this 10 times with randomly chosen partners, but how can you know that your partners are not all just sock puppets of one malicious entity (on an anonymous network, it is trivial to create as many fake users as you want )? If that is the case, then your efforts are in vain.
Compare this with Zerocoin, where you put your coins in an accumulator, and they are mixed with the coins of all users who have put coins into that accumulator, since the beginning of Zerocoin. There would be a different accumulator for different denominations of Anoncoins (1, 5, 10, 50 ANC, etc.).
To put it simply, the more users' coins your coins are mixed with, the more anonymity you have.
I cannot speak to Darkcoin's implementation (or planned implementation) of CoinJoin since I cannot seem to find any specs or code on their Github or their site. If anyone knows, please point me to them.

I look forward to a practical and secure solution for anonymity from the DarkCoin devs!

First off, these are fantastic questions. The answer to implementing this in such a way where it is very difficulty to exploit is by adding cost and verification.

Heres the gist of how I envision DarkSend to work in the long run. Some of what Im going to mention is done, some of it Im working on currently. Id love some ideas on possible attack vectors on my implementation, so we can make it as bulletproof as possible.

Pools

DarkSend adds various extensions to the Bitcoin protocol for implementing transaction pooling. Like normal Coinjoin the pools take transactions in stages. The stages currently are:

POOL_STATUS_IDLE
POOL_STATUS_ACCEPTING_INPUTS
POOL_STATUS_ACCEPTING_OUTPUTS
POOL_STATUS_SIGNING
POOL_STATUS_TRANSMISSION

So the users relay these items throughout the network as the stages happen. After all items are gathered into the pool, the transactions are merged together into one, remotely signed and then broadcasted.

Masters

To defeat propagation problems, master nodes are elected each new block. They are responsible for being the authority of what goes into the joined transaction each session. This is done in a tamperproof way, but I think its not important to the discussion.

So what is the cost?

There must be a cost to using this anonymous network, otherwise like you say there will be issues with millions of accounts popping up. Im not dead set on which solution(s) to implement, but heres a couple ideas:

Burnt Identities

Higher difficulty shares to the current block would be mined and then stored in the blockchain permanently. Multiple of these would be used for each transaction and would be burnt when misused, causing the attacker to have to mine them again.

Verification?

To use the pools it will require unique unspend outputs, someone that wants to mess with the system would have to have a large pool of funds in many addresses. So to attack a pool with 100 slots, you would require funds dispersed to 99 addresses, on 99 nodes working in common.

Other possible fee-less solutions?

There is interesting research on protecting against sybil attacks that lends itself really well to a decentralized ledger, such as this paper:

http://dimacs.rutgers.edu/Workshops/InformationSecurity/slides/gamesandreputation.pdf

The idea is to build a social graph of the inputs and outputs of each entry and they should all know different people. If 99 of them all have the same friends that they associate with, then theyll have to enter a different pool. Which will ensure the pool is not full of the nodes belonging to the attacker.

An application for machine learning?

Im been making models for trading equities for over 7 years now. I ran a financial firm that sold the signals for a few years and I have experience with natural language processing using classifiers. So, I could make a classifier and actually embed it into Darkcoin to determine which pool a node should use, to separate out nodes that seem to be in common.

Other ideas?

Im open to ideas on how to provide the best security to the network. I would love to hear what people have in mind.

Ive been working on DarkSend about a month and weve already fixed the decentralization and propagation issues, this is just another bridge to cross in the future.

Thanks!

BOOM! a month after the launch date (instamine), accumulation and forking the coin...GREAT indeed Evan *clap* *clap*

postlude...

it is not about just bugs in the code, its about how sneaky and untrustworthy dash beginnings is.