Quote from: masterluc on October 16, 2016, 09:14:48 AM

Quote from: tonych on October 15, 2016, 11:05:17 PM

Quick question: did you read the white paper?

I posted after reading your paper. And there explicitly defined that group of Witnesses may orphan the part of chain. You returned to model of trust. It is not innovation.

Please point me to the place in the white paper that made you think that "group of Witnesses may orphan the part of chain".

Quote from: masterluc on October 16, 2016, 09:14:48 AM

Did you read Satoshi white paper?

Quote

1. Introduction
Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as
trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for
most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model.
Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions cannot
avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation increases transaction costs, limiting the
minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions,
and there is a broader cost in the loss of ability to make non-reversible payments for nonreversible
services. With the possibility of reversal, the need for trust spreads. Merchants must
be wary of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would otherwise need.
A certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable. These costs and payment uncertainties
can be avoided in person by using physical currency, but no mechanism exists to make payments
over a communications channel without a trusted party.
What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust,
allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted
third party. Transactions that are computationally impractical to reverse would protect sellers
from fraud, and routine escrow mechanisms could easily be implemented to protect buyers. In
this paper, we propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer distributed
timestamp server to generate computational proof of the chronological order of transactions. The
system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any
cooperating group of attacker nodes.

6. Incentive
The incentive may help encourage nodes to stay honest. If a greedy attacker is able to
assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it
to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to
find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than
everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.

That's what I started with. And transactions in Byteball are irreversible exactly as in Bitcoin.

Quote from: masterluc on October 16, 2016, 09:14:48 AM

And what encourages your Witnesses to stay honest? Politik debates in facebook? Primaries? We see this shit in politiks. Nobody is honest there. Public face trading doesn't work as honesty enforcement IRL.

They have to be honest long before they become witnesses. They have to invest a lot in building a reputation in the real world, and they have to have a lot to lose (again, in the real world, not just in their witnessing fees in Byteball) in case they ruin the reputation. And after they become witness, everything they do on Byteball is transparent, visible, and auditable in real time. Given the slightest doubt in trustworthiness of any particular witness, there will be quite a few people to shout that witness A should be replaced with a new witness B.