Quote from: alkan on November 22, 2016, 09:30:41 PM

Quote from: iamnotback on November 21, 2016, 10:06:06 PM

The similarity is as I wrote in my prior post, that you essentially must use PoW to obtain the randomness of whom to select as the delegate to order the transactions in next block.

That's certainly the case for the model I suggested. But what about the leader election procedure described in https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/889.pdf (chapter 4.2). Doesn't it ensure true randomness?

Quote from: hv_ on November 20, 2016, 02:29:56 PM

Just found this video about a modified PoS (Prof Kiayias) , partitioned into time slots and with a random selection of new stakeholders

Shows nice graphs on theoretical central -> decentral and speed graph but missing full CAP theorem view. Watch at 15min:

https://youtu.be/pjYDWWEkgN0

At 35 min the new PoS model comes up.

Guess, it won t work....

I already commented about that:

Quote from: iamnotback on November 10, 2016, 08:54:27 AM

IOHK has proved security for a PoS system, but the assumption remains that the majority of the stake is not colluding to violate the Nash equilibrium and a majority of the stake remain online at all times. I don't see what IOHK's PoS accomplishes which isn't already accomplished by DPoS? Is it more objective w.r.t. to violations of Nash equilibrium since in DPoS the majority of the stake can be offline so can't observe first-hand any violations? DPoS is presumably provably secure if a majority of the delegates adhere to the Nash equilibrium.

So in summary, we can hide "wolverine federated systems in an illusory democratic sheepskin" and gain computational efficiency. But the security problems (or more realistically the economic centralization problem since large stake holders need insidious means as there isn't sufficient shorting liquidity for them to scorch their earth) shift to the power vacuum of political economics and the inviolable power-law distribution of wealth (beget by economies-of-scale). Yet Satoshi's design also has these centralization problems due to the power vacuum of political economics and the inviolable power-law distribution of wealth (beget by economies-of-scale).

Will anyone find another class of solution which provides long-term stable resistance to the centralization inherent in the power vacuum of political economics and the inviolable power-law distribution of wealth (beget by economies-of-scale)? Is (D)PoS already more realistically resistant to insidious effects of centralization of vested interests "stake" than Satoshi's design?

This is the Holy Grail we seek because centralized ecosystems don't scale due to the stifling politics and vested interests. In my opinion (which is probably an analysis many others share), this is what is holding back Bitcoin lately.