Quote from: alkan on February 19, 2017, 08:32:34 PM

In the meantime, feel free to read my short introduction post here to get the gist of the article:
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=1782870.msg17781997#msg17781997

Sorry I don't think you've achieved anything:

Quote from: iamnotback on February 19, 2017, 10:27:35 PM

Quote from: alkan on February 08, 2017, 07:09:33 PM

The general idea is to have special accounts (minter accounts) as a second token. In contrast to regular accounts which can be created for free, a minter account pays out interests on its current balance. These accounts cannot be created at will, but are given to the minters who successfully build blocks. Such child accounts, having a market value, can then be sold to new owners. As the interests are paid to every minter account (not just the one that creates the block), a single entity has no incentive to own more than one account, while the trade with existing accounts is strongly disincentivized.

The blockchain is exclusively built by the owners of minter accounts whose number will grow over time. As a consequence, the consensus gets increasingly decentralized and secure. A 51% attacker would not only have to pay a lot of money to get enough accounts, but he would also need to spend a lot of time (in fact, he would have to keep buying child accounts for a period of time corresponding to the current age of the blockchain).

Your assumptions about any second token not becoming centralized are incorrect.

Sorry you are wasting your time because of the inviolable bolded sentence below, otherwise stated as any resource will always become power-law or exponentially distributed:

Quote from: iamnotback on February 19, 2017, 06:01:04 PM

Quote from: iamnotback on January 22, 2017, 04:12:53 PM

The money supply will always be power-law or exponentially distributed for any resource. I document this claim with some references in my whitepaper.

What my design posits to do is maintain the consensus algorithm decentralized regardless. They key is finding a way to eliminate a Sybil attack without relying on a resource that becomes centralized. And to remove advantages due to economies-of-scale in the economics that impact the consensus algorithm and its long-term stability. I believe I have achieved it theoretically via separation-of-concerns. In other words, I slice-and-dice the responsibilities for achieving consensus such that no party has economy-of-scale incentives. I do this with a feedback mechanism, which I view as analogous to Byzantine fault detection. The design needs peer review, so assume a flaw may be found.

Please keep your replies on your design in your thread, not here.