Quote from: alkan on February 20, 2017, 09:06:05 PM

What kind of incentives are you talking about?

Understanding the abstract generative essence is more important than searching for specific failure modes. You'll find those specific failure modes eventually, because the generative essence says you will.

Quote from: alkan on February 20, 2017, 09:06:05 PM

Quote from: iamnotback on February 20, 2017, 08:12:28 PM

Impossible to prevent selling accounts.

It's impossible to prevent that completely but you can make it very risky for the buyer.

Every risk becomes a cost and lowers the ROI. You really need to understand economics.

http://www.truthcoin.info/blog/pow-cheapest/#agenda

Quote from: alkan on February 20, 2017, 09:06:05 PM

while the former owner will still know the private key (which is unchangeable) and could steal the coins back at will

So your coin becomes centralized via hacking and there is no resilience for the coin to recover from it. (The hackers drain the hacked accounts, so those accounts become permanently unfunded and inactive, so the remaining active minting accounts are centralized.)

Also your mechanism does not prevent renting an account whereby the owner proxies the desired activity of the renter. It also doesn't prevent collusion.

You can't defeat thermodynamics. There will always be a flaw when you attempt to tell nature that a fungible resource is not fungible. The low entropy of the resource is not obscured from nature.

Quote from: alkan on February 20, 2017, 09:06:05 PM

Quote from: iamnotback on February 20, 2017, 08:12:28 PM

It certainly is possible to create an asset that no one wants to buy and thus there is not point in discussing a design that will have 0 investment and security.

The main idea of my concept is to create an asset (minting account) that people only buy for one specific reason, namely to get interest on their stakes in the underlying currency.

For there to exist no power vacuum, then the value of mining (I didn't write just minting) must always be much lower than the value of interest even for someone who centralizes control over mining. Which obviously can't be true. Logic fail.

Quote from: alkan on February 20, 2017, 09:06:05 PM

Obviously, my design leverages the concept of fungibility to maximize decentralization (via interests for every minting account owner and the minimum account balance required for minting) and security (via the extensive time needed to buy the majority of accounts whose creation rate is limited).

Obviously I have shown that it does not.