Quote from: dfd1 on March 12, 2017, 08:48:55 AM

Quote from: iamnotback on March 12, 2017, 08:18:36 AM

Quote from: dfd1 on March 12, 2017, 07:23:41 AM

Quote from: iamnotback on March 10, 2017, 11:21:45 AM

Remember I had found a high school level math probability error in their InstantX whitepaper.

Can you please point us to your post with review of InstantX?

I am not digging for it. Search this forum for "netcash", then dig through TPTB_need_war's thread.

Actually it is cited in my whitepaper but I am too lazy to go grab it for you. Tongue

Then it just means it's never happened, nor your InstantX analysis nor your secret whitepaper. I searched for netcash, by the way, and found nothing relevant.

Quote from: iamnotback on March 14, 2017, 01:45:49 AM

Quote from: dfd1 on March 12, 2017, 10:20:59 AM

Quote from: iamnotback on March 12, 2017, 09:29:39 AM

Put up an escrowed bet of 0.2 BTC and I will produce the link to embarrass you.

Choose an escrow yourself, so you can't whine later about how you not trust escrow choosen by me.

Are you serious? Please don't waste my time.

Well good thing you ran away, because I just found another high school probability error and this time it is in Bitcoin Unlimited. And you'll find the links to the prior Dash peer review I did in the following quote:

Quote from: iamnotback on March 19, 2017, 09:49:18 AM

Quote from: Hyena on March 09, 2017, 06:47:12 AM

Also I find this explanation very good, also taken from BU's home page under FAQ section:

Quote from: https://www.bitcoinunlimited.info/faq

Will unlimited size blocks actually result in no fee market?

No. Intuitively you can understand this by realizing that it will take a lot longer to propagate a gigantic block across the network than a small one. Therefore a gigantic block has a higher likelihood of being "orphaned" -- that is, a competing block will be found, propagated across the network and supplant the gigantic block. In this case the miner of the gigantic block will lose the block subsidy and transaction fees. Therefore miners are incentivised by limitations in the underlying physical network to produce smaller blocks, and incentivized by transaction fees to produce larger ones.

Finding the balance between these forces is where the free market excels. As underlying physical networks improve or fees increase, miners will naturally be able to produce larger blocks. The transaction "supply" (space in a block) therefore depends directly on the fundamental capacity, rather than relying on some centralized "steering committee" to properly set maximum block size. Bitcoin is all about disintermediation, and this is another example of it working.

Bitcoin Unlimited is a vote for free markets. SegWit is like a communist centrally planned economy.

Although that sounds logical to a n00b, who ever wrote that and believes that must have forgotten or flunked their high school (or perhaps as late as 2nd year university) probability and statistics math class. Reminds me of when I found a high school level probability error in the masternode security model in Dash's InstantX white paper, not to mention how egregiously flawed the Dash the Instant X design is. Evan Duffield replied, but then ran away. Even the economic arguments for Dash's flawed design were refuted. Note that Dash's required premixing (and even not premixing if not employing homomorphic encryption of transaction values, i.e Monero before RingCT) eliminates the possibility of merging UTXO balances and thus causes an exponential blowup in UTXO, which is an issue for scaling to trillions of microtransactions given that performance requires keeping UTXO in RAM.

The probability that another block solution will be found within the propagation time t (not to be confused with at the time t) is the Poisson process (λt)e^-λt where n = 1 (i.e. only one or more occurrences required). Which as λt becomes smaller than roughly ¹/₁₀₀ then e^-λt is closely approximated by 1 - λt or approximately 1. Thus, we can see the probability that another block solution will be found within the propagation time t approximates a linear proportion λt when λt is less than roughly ¹/₁₀₀.

So with a block period (aka block time) λ of 10 minutes and a propagation time t (for finding a second block) of less than 6 seconds (and propagation will usually be less than 600 milliseconds so that is even a more linear relationship at ¹/₁₀₀₀), then presuming roughly (on average) that doubling the block size doubles both the transaction fees and the propagation time, then the miner has the same income on average with the largest possible block they can make because doubling the risk of another miner finding a block also doubles the miner's income per block statically speaking. If you don't understand this, then read it over and over until you grasp the mathematical (statistical) point that the quoted statement above is incorrect and there is no free market limit on block size and no fee market. The point being that yes the risk of another miner winning the block increases, but the miner's income commensurately (proportionally) also increases, so statistically the miner loses nothing by creating a larger block and thus is leaving tranactions fees on the table for some other miner to take if the miner doesn't make a larger block. However presuming some transactions pay less per byte than others (and higher valued transactions can afford to pay more per byte), the economic converse effect occurs wherein the miner has the incentive to make the smallest block possible or below the size where propagation latency is linearly proportional to block size (i.e. the latency that is a constant factor independent of data transferred), which is again not a free market limit on block size and not a fee market. So the same Tragedy-of-the-Commons occurs that has always been argued as the problem with unlimited block size, in that the power vacuum must be filled by a collusion of miners which pool their (at least 33% of the systemic) hashrate and selfish mine against the rest of the network enforcing a block size which maximizing their profit which is basically the highest level of fees x volume the market will bear. I had even argued (I claim successfully) against @ArticMine that Monero's algorithmically adjusting block size suffers from a similar Tragedy-of-the-Commons outcome (ultimately due to the power-law centralization of mining economies-of-scale). No matter how you slice and dice it, Satoshi's PoW will become centralized so choose your poison how you want to get there, Bitcoin Core (aka Blockstream) funded by banksters or Bitcoin Unlimited (with insufficient developer resources) lead by technical incompetents such as Roger Ver. This is why I designed (a yet unpublished) solution for blockchain consensus which is not PoW and not PoW (something totally new, which I am working on now).

Even if you try to argue that propagation out to the minority hashrate can take up to minutes, the most profitable (i.e. winning) economics models selfish mining wherein only the minimum propagation time to only 33% of the hashrate is relevant, thus it is likely to be (and currently is even to the average network diameter, i.e. the majority) less than 6 seconds.

Bitcoin has taken a big hit because of Bitcoin Unlimited. Roger Ver with his recent affiliation with the technologically flawed Dash (and his Dash pump) and attacking Bitcoin with big blocks is really trying to shake things up, but as I had explained Roger Ver is somewhat technically myopic. Also perhaps some people may be speculating Winkervoss twins might liquidate.

P.S. I liked @gmaxwell's explanation of why cryptocurrency fundamentally must rely on cryptography.

Edit: @aklan made me aware of a Bitcoin Unlimited white paper, which I am reading now and will respond soon.