Quote from: etotheipi on May 17, 2013, 04:12:44 PM

[...]
We need to get away from this wishful thinking that we can somehow adapt this proof-of-work system to work with transactions that have no proof-of-work. [...]

It still might be possible to find a solution that is good enough for a lot of purposes. Anyway it is fun to think about it.

Quote from: Mike Hearn on May 17, 2013, 05:05:39 PM

I don't think miners will be doing this regularly, for a whole bunch of reasons. It isn't the best way to maximise profit - the value of Bitcoin will be much higher in the long run if it's usable for day to day casual transactions.

A lot of people are very short sighted. Also it might pay quite well.

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But regardless, if you look at stratum it doesn't actually let miners control what's in the block. Nor does GBT, as far as I know, it just allows auditing.

from http://mining.bitcoin.cz/stratum-mining:

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There's really only one reason why Stratum is worse than getblocktemplate solution at this time: miners cannot choose Bitcoin transactions on their own. [...]
I already have some ideas for Stratum mining protocol extension, where miners will be able to suggest their own merkle branch (I call it internally democratic mining), which will solve such issues as centralized selection of transactions.

Quote from: trout on May 17, 2013, 05:14:58 PM

The whole reason the block chain exists is to prevent double spends.
If anyone finds a "safe" way to accept 0-conf transactions, [...]

"safe" != "safe enough"

Quote from: tholenst on May 18, 2013, 06:09:54 PM

Quote from: jaywaka2713 on May 18, 2013, 04:24:38 PM

Explain your idea of this 10 BTC fee to the miner. [...]

The idea is as follows: to pay 1 BTC to V, you need to have an additional 10 BTC on a second address (like a deposit).
You then give V a normal transaction T1, and a second transaction T2. In case T1 is a double spend, V can use T2 to make 10 BTC go to the miner.
In the example you quoted, TX3Out needs to have at least 10.2 BTC in them (which are also owned by the person who wants to pay V).

Together with the double spend the bad guy also spends the deposit. Not sure if you are aware that it is possible to communicate directly to the miner and the miner does not have to relay the TXs to others ("double spend specialist miner", "replacer miner"). Orphaned blocks increase the risk for the bad guys, though.

Please take detailed discussion of this concept back to the original thread: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=196136

What about this box of Pandora: Nodes could delay relaying of blocks including double spends (txs replacing txs the node knows about).

Side note: could delaying relay of blocks with unknown txs give miners an incentive to relay?