Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 09:50:32 AM

Huh? Who needs to spend their incoming funds that quickly? Not most scenarios.

trading exchange for example, only the most common type of transaction probably.

Day trading you mean. Most traders I know do not day trade crypto. And those who do day trade do it on centralized exchanges thus offchain.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 09:50:32 AM

Nope. Basically a gentlemens club of you scratch my back, then I will scratch yours. And essentially of these systems end up being centrally controlled by an oligarchy.

That's your opinion. Plus you might just view reliable witnesses being voted in consistently as an oligarchy - hard to say. You don't need any coins to be voted in.
Out of all the options it seems to be the least bad.

Well it is not just an opinion, but rather the generative essence of the matter which is argued to be inviolable. That is why cited this comment from the 160 IQ genius who created the term open source and the other very astute blog from the highly intelligent Paul Sztorc.

And just because you have not thought of other options, doesnt mean you can logically conclude there cant exist possible better options. Youre not omniscient. For example, do you know the design of my decentralized ledger? If you do, I must ask you how you obtained such top secret information?

I hope to entirely eliminate voting! I think Dan is wrong where he claimed in that all decentralized ledger consensus is equivalent to voting. Wrong. Voting is subjective. Objectivity requires that votes do not matter. That is what proof-of-work attempts to accomplish. No one in theory gets a vote on the outcome with PoW, presuming that hash rate is decentralized. The nothing-at-stake problem was in theory avoided by burning external hard resources such as electricity, so as to avoid the problems of voting, sock puppets and other forms of political manipulation and the power vacuum thereof. That was the epiphany of PoW as idealized in the original Bitcoin white paper (although it apparently has fallen apart in practice for various reasons). Seems Dan missed the entire point, which is perhaps the generative essence of why Satoshi was politely slapping him back down (although I have my suspicions about whether Satoshis true intentions were for the ideal of decentralization, yet still he would be expected to pretend so).

Dan is afaics a neophyte (relatively speaking to Vitalik et al) when it comes to some facets of the research and theory of Byzantine systems. He is evidently an applied expert on building certain aspects of systems. But he is evidently not an expert of all facets of the theory. Vitalik is much more skilled in that theory area (and too much so I think so much time was lost on theoretical cul-de-sacs), but Vitalik is weaker in applied aspects and depends on others for that. I straddle both areas of focus to some more or less degree (^{but a chronically ill person who cant recall where the door is due to liver induced brain fog, thus cant code, that is just a fact of nature, but when a person has become healthy then others might expect he cant do something which is quite capable of doing and I like that very much}).

Hey IOHK is also working on smart contracts and they have a formerly verified secure PoS with a delegated option as well. And they are proving they can do applied work and have launched a blockchain. Theres also NEO but I do not know much about it yet. Dan and Vitalik are not the only horses in this race.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Also approval voting takes care of that in part: https://i.imgur.com/GmixVHd.png

Each coin and thus coin holder controls the system in the end - quite literally and formalized.

approval voting apparently means that each voter can vote multiple times, one vote each for each of the 21 slots for block producers or the 100 witnesses. Thus no whale with less than a majority of the stake could ensue winning a slot.

Yet that does nothing to ameliorate the winner-take-all power vacuum of voting which inviolably leads to an oligarchy in control. Again I refer to the aforementioned two links on the political-economics issues with voting.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Vitalik

Anyone who experiences prolonged unexpected spikes in demand (ie. pretty much eveyone); users will have to buy enough coins to cover perhaps the 99th percentile of their expected usage, so that they don't get stuck being "out of gas" and having to go to an exchange.

he has it backwards - you get coins to be guaranteed some bandwidth under maximum load, anything extra you get is free bonus when network is under lighter load. and again, can rent or borrow more.

No he has it correct. Youre not factoring in his point about a DoS attack which I elaborated for those of you with a slow mind. Again refer to the blue highlighted text in my post to which you are replying to.

The rest of your quotes and comments about Vitalik were nonsensical because you took them out of the context of his argument and point, which you apparently did not grasp. Again read the blue text in my post to which you are replying.

It is quite hilarious the Dunning-Kruger replies I get here. You all think Vitalik is wrong because you do not even understand what is writing. His IQ is too high for you all to even understand.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 09:50:32 AM

Linear will be entirely gamed and thus centralized anew

being gamed isn't the issue, it's if system is usable by everyone - honest or not. who cares what people use it for. point is they are distributed by honest participants to honest participants, losses to gaming are assumed by default.

Now you have proved to me that you in Dunning-Kruger or lazy mode.

You do not even understand what you are writing about.

The entire point is that if it can be gamed, then it means it is a power vacuum where the honest are destroyed. Did you not read my blog which I linked for you?

Quote from: https://steemit.com/steem/@anonymint/blog-rewards-can-t-be-widely-distributed

Voters could vote for their own posts as the maximum profit strategy because the imparted reward per voter is not tied to any risk of popularity, so those who vote their conscience would eventually over time have their wealth redistributed via debasement to those who always voted for themselves.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 09:50:32 AM

So now we have community voting for which apps get funded? Another huge pot of money grab for whales.

That's why he focused so much on getting good distribution to make it too expensive to grab coins. Just think of whales getting more as staking. Honest people can still get what they need from honest participants.

Can you please turn off the nonsense noise box and turn on your brain.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 09:50:32 AM

Fact is that Steemit was down.

Steemit website is not relevant to steem. I don't even understand how little someone might know about blockchains to think a random website being up is important for any discussion. And the steem blockchain was not down. I do know of an instance when one dpos chain was down, and this isn't it or even close, and it wasn't a big deal.

This nonsense type of reply was blown to smithereens in my prior post. If you cant comprehend it, it is not my job to explain it to you further.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 09:50:32 AM

And 20 delegates is not a lot for the national securities agencies to take down if ever they need to.

It's not 20, it's at least 100 in top 100 list and unknown numbers afterwards with only few minutes it takes to spin up a new witness node and get current state.

I also stated 100 is not a lot. And again the entire point is that voting == centralization. Dan says he hates the corruption and violence of governments, yet then he goes and creates voting and governance. Lol.

And no you do not spin up new things out of thin air without voting for them in DPoS. And the oligarchy in control of voting behind their sock puppets is always going to be in control of all the replacements in any voting arrangement. The government only needs to rubber hose Dan and his money grabbing comrade whales.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 09:50:32 AM

formal specification for DPoS

it's called github code. plus which one, there's like 20 versions continuously evolving. dan even wrote this recently.

Source code is not a specification.

And putting specifications on Steemit under a personal account name is not the correct way to disseminate documentation for the repository to which it applies. And the linked blog is still not a formal specification.

I should be able to go to one official resource and read everything I need to know.

Cripes you are fundraising $300+ million from non-accredited investors and you expect them to go hunting around in source code. Roll Eyes

And the following is incorrect!

Quote from: https://steemit.com/dpos/@dantheman/dpos-consensus-algorithm-this-missing-white-paper

All blockchains are fundamentally a deterministic state machine acted upon by transactions.

Quote from: https://steemit.com/dpos/@dantheman/dpos-consensus-algorithm-this-missing-white-paper

Note that this rule is similar to the 6-block confirmation rule for Bitcoin.

Proof-of-work is probabilistic, not deterministic. DPoS if formally specified as Byzantine agreement is deterministic if the liveness threshold is met, but it comes with the disadvantages I mentioned before such as not being permissionless and can be entirely stalled.

And again he repeats the same mistake, even I had already taught him this is incorrect (he forgot apparently):

Quote from: https://steemit.com/dpos/@dantheman/dpos-consensus-algorithm-this-missing-white-paper

Like all consensus algorithms, the most harm the block producers can cause is censorship. All blocks must be valid according to the deterministic open source state machine logic.

Here is how I explained in a prior post which you apparently did not comprehend:

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 06:06:37 AM

Dan is still making technological mistakes. He erroneously claimed that block producers in DPoS do not have the power to produce incorrect blocks. I understand he is thinking about verification of transactions, but he is continuing to making the mistake he made when I corrected him before. DPoS is Byzantine Agreement, and thus if more than 2/3 collude they can double-spend and its impossible to know which delegate block producers are lying and which are telling the truth about the ordering of transactions. He continues to not understand this. Yet he seems to admit it. Additionally if more than 1/3 stop producing blocks, then there is no objectivity on the ordering of blocks, due to the liveness threshold being exceeded. That he does not acknowledge this and what can catastrophically happen by putting centralized power in the hands of a dozen delegates, exemplifies to me that he still doesnt quite grasp all the risks.

Just imagine if the government goes after these block producers with rubber hoses and national security gag orders.

Dan even admits these delegated block producers can censor transactions, seize accounts, etc..

The following is incorrect! There is no way to get back an objective state once the liveness threshold is not met. The only way is to hardfork this blockchain. We already had this debate and discussion over in the Cosmos and Tendermint threads which Dan participated in.

Quote from: https://steemit.com/dpos/@dantheman/dpos-consensus-algorithm-this-missing-white-paper

Lack of Quorum of Producers

In the unlikely event that there is no clear quorum of producers, it is possible for the minority to continue producing blocks. In these blocks stakeholders can include transactions that change their votes. These votes can then select a new set of producers and restore block production participation to 100%. Once this happens the minority chain will eventually overtake all other chains operating with less than 100% participation.

[]

Unlike some competing algorithms, DPOS can continue to function when a majority of producers fail. During this process the community can vote to replace the failed producers until it can resume 100% participation. I know of no other consensus algorithm that is robust under such a high and varied failure conditions.

Dan even linked to the discussions where I had explained to him and them about this.

The following is also incorrect! OMG, and this is the guy you are giving $300 million to. Dan needs to read the research on Byzantine agreement systems which starts from decades ago. With 2/3 control a Byzantine agreement system never has any objectivity. This is really troublesome that this guy is being entrusted the way he is given he does not even know basic fundamentals.

Quote from: https://steemit.com/dpos/@dantheman/dpos-consensus-algorithm-this-missing-white-paper

Corruption of Majority of Producers

If the majority of producers become corrupt then they can produce an unlimited number of forks, each of which will appear to be advancing with 2⁄3 majority confirmation. In this case the last irreversible block algorithm reverts to longest chain algorithm. The longest chain will be the one approved by the largest-majority which will be decided by the minority of remaining honest nodes.

The following is also incorrect! With 2/3 control over block producers it is possible to make it appear that block producers were lied to and were forced to sign conflicting forks and it will be impossible to prove which producers are lying and which are honest. Thus the 2/3 majority can continue on signing the fork and nobody can prove which of the 2/3 are complicit, so they would not know which ones to vote out and destroy. If they destroy the honest ones also, then the system is dyfunctional. The reason Dan does not understand this is because he has never studied the research on Byzantine agreement. Thus he is speaking out of his asshole. This is pitiful. And all you n00bs fall for this. I did the research! That is what I was explained at the Cosmos/Tendermint thread but they decided they wanted me to leave so I left. And then Dan continued on with his neophyte misunderstanding summarized as follows.

My attitude was never interrupt the enemy when he is in the process of destroying himself.

Quote from: https://steemit.com/steem/@dantheman/response-to-cosmos-white-paper-s-claims-on-dpos-security

If the majority of the block producers collude to produce a longer chain in an attempt to fork beyond the last irreversible block, then no exchange, block explorer, merchant, or other validator would switch to that fork. The entire world will agree on the "first fork seen".

This means that the only way to effect a double spend / reversal beyond last irreversible block is to isolate your victim and partition the network + collusion of producers.

[]

I believe I have proven the the block producers cannot defraud 1000's of independent validators without partitioning the network

[]

The blockchain will remain live (advancing the last irreversible block) so long as at least 1 block producer is able to process enough pending transactions to elect a new set of witnesses who then start producing the last irreversible block.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 09:50:32 AM

weaknesses of DPoS being that it is form of byzantine agreement (which has liveness threshold flaw)

treshhold flaw is nonsense as mentioned in this comment. All his proposed weaknesses require 2/3+1 of witnesses to collude to fork, better than chance based in pow where even <50% can attack.

it was brought up in coversation about tendermint/cosmos liveness flaw, not dpos: "1/3+ can halt the consensus process" also mentioned here. It refers to LIB (optional guideline of when chance of irreversibility is extremely high) but simply waiting for all witnesses instead of 2/3 to validate is enough.

Sorry as I mentioned above, all of that is incorrect. Dan needs to go read the research.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 09:50:32 AM

trying compare proof-of-work systems which have probabilitistic finality and permissionless block producers, with no liveness theshold to permissioned byzantine agreement which has a 1/3 liveness threshold and permissioned number of block producers

dpos doesn't have that treshhold, it literally has no liveness issues unless 2/3+1 collude, so you're clearly out of scope. you're thinking tendermint.

Youre confused on multiple levels. The liveness threshold (1/3-1) is not the limit of collusion (2/3+1). And DPoS and Tendermint are both Byzantine agreement. And apparently Dan does not realize this fact.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

I love how vitalik ignored all the major corrections and criticisms, like not knowing the basics about dpos. and focuses on obsurd things.

You are not capable of even understanding what Vitalik is writing. And I am not going to waste my time trying to unravel your bizarre ~~interpretations~~[hallucinations] about what Vitalik wrote.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

I think everyone agrees with this. It's the least sucky thing I'm aware of.

Well perhaps that argument could be made in terms of production ready blockchains. I would need to think about this some more though. I am willing to concede that point for now.

Byteball with a few tweaks is superior. That is once we discard the nonsense claims Dan made as quoted above which are incorrect. And mine will improve on Byteball in a way that is I think unexpected. Both of which are not block chains.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 09:50:32 AM

Due to a Sybil attack and sock puppet identities, it is very easy to make it look like DPoS has distinct control, when in fact it can be (and per the iron law of political economics, it must be) just an oligarchy behind the curtain controlling it all.

That is not to say that proof-of-work does not have issues also, but to paint DPoS as some panacea is really deception and fraudulent misrepresentation of the material facts.

[] And you're right, all of them can be sybil attacked, hell every color on every coin can be same person in control. what I'm saying is that dpos relatively has best attempt to remedy wealth concentration.

I dont think I can agree it is clearly superior for remedy wealth concentration. I currently see pretty much everything in blockchains is all about wealth concentration from greater fools to snakes.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 09:50:32 AM

You could have at least done the SAFT and limited it to accredited investors.

p.s. I hate ICO's and think they are all securities too no matter what.

I am willing to tolerate a minimal amount of fundraising to advance progress (e.g. $5 - 10 million) if it does not sell the majority of the token supply. I want the token supply to be awarded for onboarding but unfortunately the Steem voting method seems insolubly flawed so I tried to find another way that would be legal.

I will not respond to your other comments about alternative issuance and launch strategies.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

wait your solution for distribution issue is to make it permissioned? lmao.

I do not think it is possible to make distribution permissionless. Proof-of-work is competitive but the problem is that most people cant compete thus the onboarding is very narrow and the token stays mired as a speculation and HODLER coin.

What I hope is that it is possible to convince the market that the distribution is meritorious and objective (not biased, no nepotism and kickbacks). Then the permissioned aspect has to be dealt with in terms of securities laws, which can be an orthogonal issue to the perceived objectivity of the distribution. Ongoing the decentralized ledger can be permissionless if it is proof-of-work, except that PoW has apparently flaws that it becomes permissioned eventually. So thus I intend to bring an entirely new consensus algorithm and well see how it holds up to peer review. But I do not expect a panacea. And I will not fight nonsensically/ignorantly to obfuscate any flaws like the other clowns do around there.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

no matter what you do, even if you ID everyone, it can still be real life sock puppets

Real production cant be a sock puppet. Marketing companies know how to measure metrics about what is creating value and what is not. This is a science and a craft.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 09:50:32 AM

given that all the bids are pooled to determine the price for the tokens offered during each interval

you have it backwards. because liquidity is likely higher on exchanges than in each individual day pool, price is determined by exchanges with ICO price being an afterthought for arbitrage and inflation.

What I wrote was correct. Just because the price that the participants target is dictated by external factors, does not make my statement false. Learn logic.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 09:50:32 AM

DPoS is Byzantine Agreement

it's not.

You would not even know how to make that determination. Read the research. I am not being paid to explain this to people who do not know.

Quote from: scaryvirus on October 21, 2017, 01:35:44 PM

Quote from: Hyperme.sh on October 21, 2017, 09:50:32 AM

then there is no objectivity on the ordering of blocks, due to the liveness threshold being exceeded. That he does not acknowledge this and what can catastrophically happen by putting centralized power in the hands of a dozen delegates, exemplifies to me that he still doesnt quite grasp all the risks.

well, at least you're not claiming it goes to a halt then

The objectivity does halt if the liveness threshold is exceeded. That is unless there is objective bounded synchronisation of the block producers (which is what IOHKs Ouroboros is about but the majority of the stake has to remain online at all times). Again I am just going to tell you and Dan to read the research.

Its all because propagation is not proof of fault in an asynchronous network. The is what the FLP theorem and other research is about.