Re: [ANN] Official AnonCoin thread - Client Update!! (Native I2P, TOR nodes)

Apologies if this has already been asked upthead. I didn't have time to read the entire thread.

Does Anoncoin not view high-latency for I2P as critically urgent as I do?

https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=273197.msg2950363#msg2950363
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=276849.msg2955966#msg2955966
https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=273197.msg2950849#msg2950849

I2P doesn't plan on implementing until version 3.0? When is that ETA?

Quote from: K1773R on August 17, 2013, 11:22:13 PM

only bitcoin and anoncoin so far work with i2p

Bitcoin doesn't require all winning blocks to be sent over I2P, thus in a high-latency setup, those miners who want their awarded coins to be anonymous, would be at a timing disadvantage.

I assume anoncoin requires all winning blocks to be sent over I2P?

nope, you can send it over i2p, TOR (to clearnet or HS nodes) and clearnet.
the main idea about i2p in anoncoin is to eliminate attacks to find your location and making listening on others connections impossible. (from a technical view)

Don't we want miners to be anonymous when they are awarded coins for PoW of the winning block?

So then if they use the high-latency setting to be confidently anonymous, they are at a speed disadvantage to those miners who don't want to be anonymous (e.g. the corporations, etc).

Also does anyone understand and agree that without high-latency, the NSA knows who you are? (due to timing attacks are possible on low-latency mix-nets)

nope, i2p is end to end encrypted, nobody (beside the involved ones) knows what passes from where to where, ie someone else cant see who published it or how high their latency is.

Timing attacks work regardless of end-to-end encryption.

My understanding is that all low-latency mix-nets are subject to timing attacks. Perhaps you should read up on the research before making a claim? Or am I missing something?

Note Tor and I2P are both Chaum mix-nets (so what applies to low-latency attacks of Tor applies also to I2P):

https://blog.torproject.org/blog/one-cell-enough
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~sjm217/papers/oakland05torta.pdf

ok, good to see someone with knowledge around here

i2p user (A) finds blocks, broadcasts to all users in i2p (UI), now some of the UI are connected to clearnet, some user (B) broadcast it over clearnet to the other nodes, so with a timing attack you could find user B but not user A

My understanding is that with a timing attack on low-latency mix-nets, you can identify A because you watch the statistical timing of packets throughout the darknet (I2P) to determine where they are originating from by IP address. It is not necessary to know what it is inside the packets.

Whereas, with high-latency mix-nets, the peers scramble and delay some packets in random orders and delays, so that the statistical timing attack is foiled.

yes, there are delays.

more informations which will answer 90% of your questions:
http://www.i2p2.de/how_threatmodel.html#timing (i would suggest to read the full threat model).
http://www.i2p2.de/techintro.html
http://www.i2p2.de/how_networkcomparisons.html

if your further interested then this can link you to more info -> http://www.i2p2.de/how.html (the rest of the page also, of course)

I read those before coming to this thread.

I am trying to warn you that I2P does not have high latency delays yet. It is planned for version 3.0.

And without those high-latency delays, the NSA can know who A is.

This is not yet an anonymous coin.

The I2P one-way paths and (on top of I2P) application protocol delays doesn't protect against the sophisticated timing analysis. The delays must be put into the I2P peers who are relaying the packets.