Quote from: BurningToad on July 06, 2011, 01:31:57 PM

Sorry GimEEE, that was just a temporary fix. Pool hoppers could still get around my tricks to try and show them a short round length.
The alternative, delaying stats by average block solve time, is impossible for a small pool that can only expect to solve one block a day.
Thus, I think the best system IS SMPPS. We have just switched to it. It is true that *Any pps will *NEVER* pay higher than proportional equivalent*. It is also true that we will never pay LOWER than a proportional pool. The total BTC payout is exactly the same, because the pool pays out all BTC that it earns. However, the difference is that with SMPPS, the payouts will be more fairly and more evenly distributed to miners, and the loyal miners will not be losing BTC to pool hoppers.

The problem with the wtfpps system is it operates under the false assumption of an infinite mining contract.
What if I mine on a wtfpps system for one full block of 30 minutes and receive a fraction of the normal proportional equivalent, then end the mining contract?
Doesn't the pool keep that unpaid difference (proportional expected - wtfpps rewarded)?

Simple example - The entire bitcoin network uses wtfpps for 5minutes, finds a block, then quits to go back to keeping their full earnings each round. Payout is maybe 25btc (or less in faster finds) and unpaid of 25btc. This extra 25 btc will be spent by the pool eventually won't it? Or you keep it in reserve ad infinitum in hopes of the whole bitcoin network giving you more work?

Am I missing something for the single block miner in this case?