Quote from: itzazkrit on April 05, 2018, 09:35:54 PM

... I think we are all still better off today than if they never came along.

I disagree. Halong's method of choice for patenting their implementation of AsicBoost the Blockchain Defensive Patent License (BDPL) actually sets the stage for further centralization of mining technology, and not the converse as advertised by Halong and the BDPL's website.

Under the first question of the BDPL website's FAQ page "How do you benefit by using the BDPL?" it is stated that in return for immunity from patent-related lawsuits from other BDPL users, each BDPL user receives "royalty-free licenses from every other user's patent portfolio." This looks great at first glance on its surface, because it seems to encourage technology-sharing and prevents any one BDPL user from being a patent troll.

However, upon closer inspection, the BDPL begins to look more and more like a very cleverly disguised weapon designed to obtain competitors' valuable intellectual property for free, and then snuff them out.

We know that Halong now has their implementation of AsicBoost patented under the BDPL. If then, for example, Canaan wants to use Halong's implementation of AsicBoost, Canaan would have to join the BDPL and license all of their patented intellectual property to Halong (and other BDPL users) for free. In effect, Canaan gets AsicBoost, and Halong gets access to all of Canaan's patented technology, on which Canaan had previously spent millions, if not billions, in prior research and development. The playing field between Halong and Canaan has now been leveled, but at Canaan's expense. (It may be argued here that Canaan also has access to Halong's portfolio of patented technology under the BDPL, but at this point it is reasonable to assume that Halong doesn't have anything else to offer that is of competitive value. The BDPL only works if the playing field was already level to begin with.)

Things get worse from here. If, in the above example, Canaan now decides to pull all of their patents from the BDPL, Halong still gets to keep licensing all of Canaan's patents for free. Halong, on the other hand, is now allowed under the BDPL to impose additional terms ("fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory terms (FRAND)" according to the BDPL's website, whatever that means) on Canaan for Canaan's continued licensing of Halong's patents. In other words, Halong now gets to use Canaan's patented technology for free, while Canaan has to pay Halong to use Halong's patented technology, in addition to whatever terms that Halong may now impose on Canaan at Halong's discretion. Again, Halong wins at Canaan's expense. If Canaan hasn't already been forced to shutter their doors at this point, they may soon have to, due to them being placed at such a competitive disadvantage as a result of the BDPL's terms.

This is but one slice of how the BDPL is designed to unfairly benefit startups like Halong startups who dangle one carrot in exchange for a thousand pieces of gold. A better and more equitable way of democratizing access to mining technology would be to release them under one of the many free and open-source software and hardware licenses.

So no, we are not better off today than if Halong and the BDPL never came along. We may actually have regressed far more than we realize.