The _protocol_ needs no maximum on the block size. The miners, being the ones who are affected by the block size, can set it without your soviet. At whatever point makes sense from a market demand and supply perspective.
Let me get this correct, you did advocate for larger blocks, but now you don't.
You changed your mind.
You are incorrect. My advocacy has always been for
no protocol-determined block limit. For such is exactly equivalent to a centrally-planned production quota. And production quotas -- to the extent that they are enforceable -- are invariably economically inefficient, ensuring crappy outcomes for most participants.
In case you had not noticed, miners have always been happy to mine blocks large enough such that average wait tx latencies were darned near universally next-block or so. That is, until blocks became persistently full, making such performance impossible.
At 1MB in size, blocks are so trivially small that miners' only consideration was in maximizing tx fees in the blocks they are building. Leading to blocks not being persistently full until the number of txs desired by the community became in excess of the block size limit. Obviously, such an issue can be solved by increasing the block size limit.
Of course, at some size (specific size thereof unknowable to the central planners), block size will be problematic. But
the market will solve this issue. At the point where block propagation increases due to size leads to a higher incidence of orphaning, that is where the equilibrium point for block size will be set. Again, assuming no centrally-planned max, and that sufficient txs are available to build such large blocks.
What you really want is a "dynamic block size", that Miner's will set themselves, be it Small (80kB) or Large (8GB), doesn't matter.
Absolutely. Now you seem to have caught up.
and what would you do when groups spam the blocks to make them large and reduce the number of nodes?
What would you have me do? For the eleventy-bajillion-and-oneth time, a large number of so-called 'nodes' provide no value to the network as a whole. Of course, I'll probably continue to run a full-validating, non-mining wallet client or three for myself, as I like to be able to create txs that need no intermediaries.
What will you do when groups spam your small blocks, leading to the txs you desire unable to get included in the chain in under weeks, and even then at a cost of $thousands?
Is anyone going to pull you up on this one? Look above, you said you advocate for larger blocks.
And now you advocate for a dynamic block, only after i mentioned dynamic block, which you never mentioned previously.
What, are you arguing in bad faith, trying to trip me up in semantics? Your supplied definition of 'dynamic block size' (underlined above) as one that "Miner's [sic] will set themselves" does not comport to the long-accepted definition of the concept of 'dynamic block size', the accepted definition being
a block size limit determined algorithmically via the protocol, set to some value dependent upon some previous set of mined block sizes. Which is certainly not equivalent to "Miner's [sic] will set themselves, be it Small (80kB) or Large (8GB), doesn't matter." I just papered over this gaffe of yours in order to move the discussion along. I see now you are more interested in a game of cat and mouse rather than any actual discussion of value.
What I have agreed to above is not your misuse of the term 'dynamic block size', but rather the concept that miners set the size of the block they produce with no protocol-imposed limit (i.e., your 'definition's' dependent clause). As I have said over and over (and over and ...).
If that is the case and it is dynamic blocks and not bigger blocks, then you also must support the current and smaller block size as it fits within your framework of a dynamic block.
That is just stupid. Miners have always been able to mine blocks smaller than any protocol limit.
The thing is, when mining a block it doesn't matter what size the block is, the cost to generate such blocks are the same.
Absolutely false. Not all blocks take the same amount of time to validate, and not all blocks take the same amount of time to propagate. To a first order approximation, the block size is a major determinant of these times. I shudder to think that I need to explain this to you. If a block takes longer to process -- such that a block that was solved later by a competing miner is accepted into the blockchain sooner -- that former block is orphaned. The loss of income from that orphaning process is a very real cost. Whether you recognize it as such or not.
Production Quota are economically inefficient?
Yes. Read some economics, ignoramus.
You talk about the market this, the market that, the market will, well the market has spoken mate! and You and BCH/BSV and what every other shitcoin you represent are the weakest link!
The last refuge of the loser: spout an irrelevancy intended to insult the other party.
Good Bye!
Thank god.
Your arguments are inane, disingenuous, ineffectual, and dishonest. I'm more than happy to not have to counter your bullshit any longer.edit: strikethrough immediately preceding. While this particular post was indeed 'inane, disingenuous, ineffectual, and dishonest', I see a subsequent post actually contained an argument. Unpersuasive though it be, it still addressed points of substance.