Quote from: CipherAnthem on February 10, 2014, 12:54:14 PM

In my opinion having to share the SecurePrint code among all fragments in an M-of-N fragmented backup scenario, is a security flaw. If an adversary manages to get access to all the fragments without the SecurePrint code (e.g by MITM the printer) he will only have to get a hold of one of the fragments to be able to get the SecurePrint code and restore the wallet.

I don't consider this to be a critical security flaw, but still something worth considering and maybe fixing for a future release.

This was intentional. Multiple codes are not required to protect the fragments from the printer. What you describe is still a multi-point attack, which is the point of fragmented backups in the first place. A compromised printer alone will not result in theft, and a compromised single fragment will not result in theft either. If someone has access to both your printer, and at least one of your fragments, they are targeting you (and have a lot of access to your life), and will probably find ways to compromise you anyway.

It achieves its goal of mitigating casual threats, which may attack thousands of people at once (such as malware), and take whatever is easy and unprotected, and forego complex, physical, targeted attacks on any particular person.