Relaying a response:
Riiiiight. Immutable. Much smaller than 1MB. Immutable. Riiiiiiiight.
Joe I find it impossible to fathom how you can be so incapable of assimilating my arguments and points.
Upthread I quoted (actually @figmentofmyass quoted and I responded) where Satoshi stated that v0.1 locked the major protocol decisions in stone. His point was that once he left (given that he was the creator of Bitcoin), the protocol would be immutable. When Satoshi made the decision to explicitly announce setting a hard limit of 1 MB in the client (before that any blocksize was only apparently a suggested limit, which implicitly provided a Schelling point) and then chose to disappear without addressing the pleas to raise the blocksize again, he had left us with a legacy, immutable Bitcoin with a 1 MB hard blocksize limit.
It doesnt matter what I say or what anyone thinks. The fact is that Satoshi inserted a very clever game theory into his legacy, immutable Bitcoin, such that all soft forks will eventually hard fork off and destroy themselves. This is apparently what is going to happen to Core Bitcoin probably at of the halving event May 2020 if Craig Wright is not bluffing. Because the SegWit anyone can spend booty has piled up (to last time I checked 6+ million BTC dangling as a carrot in front of the miners).
And it doesnt matter what I say or you think about immutability. Variable blocksizes are not a decentralized Schelling point. They only converge to a single longest chain if the mining is sufficiently centralized so as to enforce a Schelling point. IOW, variable blocksizes change the game theory of proof-of-work to a power vacuum that requires essentially 33 51% mining centralization. Why is this game theory concept so difficult for you to wrap your mind around?
Variable blocksize is incongruent with one of the most important attributes of the game theory of decentralized proof-of-work as follows:
You go right ahead with your willful myopia and lose all your wealth. Dont let me stop you. Ive tried to help you, but youre as impenetrable as a stubborn donkey. Wealth (extreme luxury) is apparently so important to you and the Lord instructs us that riches stored on earth (instead of up in heaven) will grow wings and fly away.
How?
A miner cannot censor my transaction.
Centralization = 51% attack (or sufficient percent such as perhaps 33%). A 51% (or sufficient majority) attack can surreptitiously censor anything whether it be entire blocks or just blocks that have transactions which are to be disallowed.
In order for there to be an enforceable Schelling Point that will converge to a single longest chain with a variable blocksize, then some group of miners have to agree to censor all blocks which do not conform to a specific blocksize limit of choice. Otherwise the chain will implicitly fork off into numbers forks because of disagreement. Upthread (or perhaps it was in another thread) I had discussed the specific mechanisms in BSV and explained why this is still the case. I am not going to repeat that again. There is a blog comment on my Steemit blog that explains it in detail. And no I dont feel like digging for it again. Sorry I am not going to revisit all my past discussion over and over again, everytime some new disinformation agent comes into a thread and refuses to do his homework. How about you go digging for it. if youre sincere.
Note it may not actually require 51% to censor and set Schelling points. It depends on how smoothly distributed are those who vehemently want to override any choices. Otherwise with a higher orphan rate and much greater number of blocks to orphaning (aka convergence) then less than 51% can suffice.
I just did.
Why do you compare yourself to me? Do realize I have been studying and doing deep research about blockchain technology and theory since 2013. I have had no other job during these past 6 years. Thus I might know a few concepts about blockchain game theory which you dont. Who are you?
Oh dear. Are you for real?
It is a fork in the protocol. The nodes have to decide. The hodlers are not relevant.
Read the Rogue Wave thread and educate yourself.
Miners vote again every block. The vote is never final w.r.t. to protocol changes. The clever game theory poison pill that Satoshi inserted into his immutable Bitcoin protocol, is such that all soft forks are anyone can spend and thus a huge booty piles up for the miners to partake. This is an asymmetrical advantage for the legacy protocol, because when the miners take the booty, Core hard forks off and thus all the hodlers who were holding legacy addresses (i.e. begin with a 1 instead of a 3) get both legacy and free air-drop Core tokens after the fork. Whereas, those idiots who were hodling Core (aka SegWit) addresses only get Core tokens after the fork.
So only the hodlers will make the final decision when Core is forced to fork off, because the hodlers will decide which tokens they sell and which they keep. Normally all free air drop tokens are sold and everyone chooses to keep legacy Bitcoin. And Craig Wrights cratering of the Core price (and bankrupting all the exchanges which hodl in SegWit addresses) will help to insure that will be the case.
It's good thing that Satoshi's posts have been recorded, and people can go and see for themselves what he said.
Yeah here is the thread and post where someone remarked that if the limit was not removed then it would be almost impossible to ever change it. Satoshi did not reply. You can clearly see that Satoshi conveniently ignored that plea right before his globalist handlers arranged for an excuse for him to disappear (c.f. also).
Quote from: Shelby Moore
Quote from: Shelby Moore
apparently originally even much smaller than 1 MB
Riiiiight. Immutable. Much smaller than 1MB. Immutable. Riiiiiiiight.
Joe I find it impossible to fathom how you can be so incapable of assimilating my arguments and points.
Upthread I quoted (actually @figmentofmyass quoted and I responded) where Satoshi stated that v0.1 locked the major protocol decisions in stone. His point was that once he left (given that he was the creator of Bitcoin), the protocol would be immutable. When Satoshi made the decision to explicitly announce setting a hard limit of 1 MB in the client (before that any blocksize was only apparently a suggested limit, which implicitly provided a Schelling point) and then chose to disappear without addressing the pleas to raise the blocksize again, he had left us with a legacy, immutable Bitcoin with a 1 MB hard blocksize limit.
It doesnt matter what I say or what anyone thinks. The fact is that Satoshi inserted a very clever game theory into his legacy, immutable Bitcoin, such that all soft forks will eventually hard fork off and destroy themselves. This is apparently what is going to happen to Core Bitcoin probably at of the halving event May 2020 if Craig Wright is not bluffing. Because the SegWit anyone can spend booty has piled up (to last time I checked 6+ million BTC dangling as a carrot in front of the miners).
And it doesnt matter what I say or you think about immutability. Variable blocksizes are not a decentralized Schelling point. They only converge to a single longest chain if the mining is sufficiently centralized so as to enforce a Schelling point. IOW, variable blocksizes change the game theory of proof-of-work to a power vacuum that requires essentially 33 51% mining centralization. Why is this game theory concept so difficult for you to wrap your mind around?
Variable blocksize is incongruent with one of the most important attributes of the game theory of decentralized proof-of-work as follows:
In POW, it is always easier and more profitable to create a sub-coalition to overthrow a coalition than it was to create the first coalition. This fact makes it so that no miner is interested in forming coalitions, because they know it is probably a trick to steal their hashpower.
From the miner's perspective, if they participate in your coalition they will probably lose all their profits. So the size of the bribe you would need to pay is about the same as the cost of renting the hashpower and mining yourself.
From the miner's perspective, if they participate in your coalition they will probably lose all their profits. So the size of the bribe you would need to pay is about the same as the cost of renting the hashpower and mining yourself.
You go right ahead with your willful myopia and lose all your wealth. Dont let me stop you. Ive tried to help you, but youre as impenetrable as a stubborn donkey. Wealth (extreme luxury) is apparently so important to you and the Lord instructs us that riches stored on earth (instead of up in heaven) will grow wings and fly away.
Quote from: Shelby Moore
What you wrote is Not Even Wrong. 
Youre off in left field derp.
Without decentralization, theres the potential for censorship and lack of permissionless system.
Youre off in left field derp.
Without decentralization, theres the potential for censorship and lack of permissionless system.
How?
A miner cannot censor my transaction.
Centralization = 51% attack (or sufficient percent such as perhaps 33%). A 51% (or sufficient majority) attack can surreptitiously censor anything whether it be entire blocks or just blocks that have transactions which are to be disallowed.
In order for there to be an enforceable Schelling Point that will converge to a single longest chain with a variable blocksize, then some group of miners have to agree to censor all blocks which do not conform to a specific blocksize limit of choice. Otherwise the chain will implicitly fork off into numbers forks because of disagreement. Upthread (or perhaps it was in another thread) I had discussed the specific mechanisms in BSV and explained why this is still the case. I am not going to repeat that again. There is a blog comment on my Steemit blog that explains it in detail. And no I dont feel like digging for it again. Sorry I am not going to revisit all my past discussion over and over again, everytime some new disinformation agent comes into a thread and refuses to do his homework. How about you go digging for it. if youre sincere.
Note it may not actually require 51% to censor and set Schelling points. It depends on how smoothly distributed are those who vehemently want to override any choices. Otherwise with a higher orphan rate and much greater number of blocks to orphaning (aka convergence) then less than 51% can suffice.
I know that you can't
I just did.
Why do you compare yourself to me? Do realize I have been studying and doing deep research about blockchain technology and theory since 2013. I have had no other job during these past 6 years. Thus I might know a few concepts about blockchain game theory which you dont. Who are you?
Quote from: Shelby Moore
Nonsense. A soft fork is not a fork because it doesnt force the hodlers of BTC to make a decision
Oh dear. Are you for real?
It is a fork in the protocol. The nodes have to decide. The hodlers are not relevant.
Read the Rogue Wave thread and educate yourself.
Miners vote again every block. The vote is never final w.r.t. to protocol changes. The clever game theory poison pill that Satoshi inserted into his immutable Bitcoin protocol, is such that all soft forks are anyone can spend and thus a huge booty piles up for the miners to partake. This is an asymmetrical advantage for the legacy protocol, because when the miners take the booty, Core hard forks off and thus all the hodlers who were holding legacy addresses (i.e. begin with a 1 instead of a 3) get both legacy and free air-drop Core tokens after the fork. Whereas, those idiots who were hodling Core (aka SegWit) addresses only get Core tokens after the fork.
So only the hodlers will make the final decision when Core is forced to fork off, because the hodlers will decide which tokens they sell and which they keep. Normally all free air drop tokens are sold and everyone chooses to keep legacy Bitcoin. And Craig Wrights cratering of the Core price (and bankrupting all the exchanges which hodl in SegWit addresses) will help to insure that will be the case.
Quote from: Shelby Moore
Youre lying
It's good thing that Satoshi's posts have been recorded, and people can go and see for themselves what he said.
Yeah here is the thread and post where someone remarked that if the limit was not removed then it would be almost impossible to ever change it. Satoshi did not reply. You can clearly see that Satoshi conveniently ignored that plea right before his globalist handlers arranged for an excuse for him to disappear (c.f. also).