Quote from: Bitalo_Maciej on March 22, 2014, 09:40:20 PM

Quote from: k99 on March 18, 2014, 01:01:53 AM

Another idea how to mitigate the blackmail attack due tx malleability would be to create a 3of3 MultiSig and delete the 3rd key directly after signing. So there is no possibility that this transaction can be changed in favor of the blackmailer.
Of course it will not help against unintendedly changed transactions (not sure if that is a real risk with malleability as well?).

It is a real risk, as it was demostraded on February that someone changed few thousand transactions for no particular reason.

Yes I was not sure first if its only due malicious behaviour, but people in bitcoin IRC channel told me that it can happen for varios reasons. So that 3rd key deletion proposal would not work. But in the link I posted before (https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=193281.msg5833231#msg5833231) there is a proposal which could work.