Quote from: o_e_l_e_o on Today at 05:42:37 PM

Lmfao. "Use a different service to make your coins private before using them with Wasabi" is the best take I've heard yet.

Or, you know, just skip that second step and just use a different service altogether. Cheesy

Yes, you can use a different service with the WabiSabi coinjoin protocol, even your own! With just one click, you can coordinate your own WabiSabi coinjoins yourself to create private coins, the code is entirely open source Cool

Quote from: 20kevin20 on Today at 05:46:28 PM

You’re joking I hope. You said you are the solution to privacy for BTC. How do I get private BTC considering you’re the only option to get privacy coins? You’re either trolling or at this point you’re trying so hard it’s starting to become embarrassing for your case.

- me: I’m really hungry but there’s no place around to go eat
- Kruw’s logic: Then just go get some food if you are really that hungry bro

What is your complaint, exactly? The WabiSabi protocol provides a way confirm the coordinator is not performing a Sybil attack.

Quote from: BlackHatCoiner on Today at 06:12:04 PM

Says the supporter of software which requires mass surveillance company's approval to have your coins mixed; which makes any coinjoin made my Wasabi objectively not trustless.

Objectively, WabiSabi coinjoins are trustless. You do not have to trust the coordinator with your coins or your privacy.

Quote from: BlackHatCoiner on Today at 06:12:04 PM

There is nothing preventing the third party from refusing any coin, and thus, from refusing a private coin.

In which case you detect the attack from the refusal of the private coin.

Quote from: BlackHatCoiner on Today at 06:12:04 PM

Great. I can't verify myself I'm subjected to a ~~Sybil attack~~ chain analysis attack, so let's buy some private coins from someone who can neither verify he's being subjected same like. Roll Eyes

You can coordinate your own WabiSabi coinjoins yourself to create private coins. The backend code is entirely open source.

Quote from: BlackHatCoiner on Today at 06:12:04 PM

There is no malicious coordinator in my hypothetical scenario. There is a malicious third party (coinVerifier named in the source code), which can arbitrarily refuse to have some coins in the WabiSabi round.

The party identified as malicious by these refusals would still be the coordinator. Whether or not the coordinator is taking orders from another party about what coins to deny doesn't make a difference in regards to the attack being detected and defeated.

Quote from: BlackHatCoiner on Today at 06:12:04 PM

The third party can attempt to attack to my non-private coin by refusing to accept any other non-private coin, accept a small number of private coins, and fill the round with their coins. That would make it look as if it's a big coinjoin, but the third party will be able to de-anonymize it much more effectively.

This would mean the Sybil attack gets detected and didn't even have a 100% chance of success in the first place.