Quote from: AlanJohnson on December 16, 2023, 07:55:54 AM

Quote from: nomachine on December 16, 2023, 06:35:41 AM

Quote from: tmar777 on December 15, 2023, 09:12:17 AM

Hi mate,

how it is going so far? How much is the real rate of keys/s?

Quantum computers, in theory, could provide a speedup for certain types of search problems, but finding hash collisions for cryptographic hash functions is not one of them. Cryptographic primitives like hash functions and ECDSA are designed to be resistant to preimage attacks, and quantum computers do not break this resistance.
Quantum computation do not pose an immediate threat to the security of Bitcoin or other widely used cryptographic systems.
This approach is more of a proof-of-concept or educational exercise rather than a practical implementation for breaking Bitcoin's security.
Quantum algorithm/hardware for solving such problems would need to be carefully designed to provide actual advantages over classical approaches.
Example:
https://arxiv.org/pdf/2302.06639.pdf
IBM Quantum Backend don't have the hardware (arithmetic circuits) available for "126 133 Cat Qubits"
If someone succeeds in doing this, they will know exactly who is capable of it in the scientific community and they have their addresses where they live. Grin

All other talk is just good advertising for these quantum backend providers.

Are you sure ?

From what i know ECDSA is vulnerable to quantum computers attack. Maybe not that one IBM allows to use for free for 10 minutes. But generally : IT'S VULNERABLE.

https://security.stackexchange.com/questions/34940/is-ecdsa-breakable-by-quantum-computers

Did you read the link above? Theoretically it is. Practically not. Equipment required for something like this goes beyond home conditions. Even ordinary quantum computers. A special laboratory is needed for such a computer.
Not to mention that laser generated random numbers are needed combined with a quantum computer. And such a quantum computer must have a special kind of qubit for Shor's algorithm....special power supplies, sub-zero cooling and a fully controlled environment.
Development and deployment of practical, large-scale quantum computers capable of breaking these algorithms are still in the early stages. Many technical challenges need to be addressed before quantum computers become a practical threat to current cryptographic systems.
Laser-generated random numbers, on the other hand, are not directly related to the security of ECDSA or other cryptographic algorithms. Random number generation is a separate aspect of cryptography that is crucial for key generation and other cryptographic processes. The use of quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms and the development of post-quantum cryptography are ongoing efforts to ensure the security of systems in a post-quantum era.