Quote from: Kruw on Today at 01:57:40 PM

What should users do with their Whirlpool change since they can't spend it to anyone besides the specific source who originally sent them the coins in the first place?

Personally, I combine toxic change with other toxic change where lack of privacy is minimum. I don't use it that much anymore though, because Monero is simply superior than both of you. There is an entire article on what to do with toxic changes, though: https://bitcoiner.guide/doxxic/.

Quote from: Kruw on Today at 01:57:40 PM

It is Whirlpool's fault because Whirlpool doesn't allow you to consolidate your coins privately like WabiSabi enables.

It has been said multiple times already that it allows you to consolidate them with a mix partner. At this point, you're just repeating the same soundbites. WabiSabi != Whirlpool, so yeah, it doesn't allow you to consolidate just as WabiSabi does.

Quote from: Kruw on Today at 01:57:40 PM

Your solution would allow Bob to DoS the coinjoin coordinator by choosing an output address that matches one of the input addresses.

No. The coordinator would simply refuse to work on a coinjoin where outputs contain addresses from inputs, just as you've programmed it to refuse "naughty" coins.

Quote from: Kruw on Today at 01:57:40 PM

What information was revealed from the 262 input collaborators and 294 output collaborators in the WabiSabi coinjoin you linked? https://kycp.org/#/710d395ca20709096a0778927cb960a466be675b188a234b9b52ffb88bb97a3e

Nothing is provably revealed, in the sense that I can be 100% sure to ownership identification, just as if I send all of my coins to a single address, you can't tell if it was self-transfer or I spent them to a merchant. But, privacy is about possibilities, and input / output collaborations and merges only worsen uncertainty. There is an entire analysis technique called Boltzmann score that computes resistance to this potential linking. WabiSabi coinjoin is worse in that matter, as it appears in kycp.org.