I don't see a danger in the transactions being picked up (or mined) by generally dis-favored miners since there is little reason for them to do so, and if they for some reason did, great.

For a lot of (but not all of) the on-chain transactions I perform, it really doesn't matter to me how fast they are mined (within reason.)  Or even if they fail completely in some recoverable way.  It's been a philosophy of mine since the GPU days that rewardprofitability is always going to approach zero so, in financial terms, it's as effective and a lot less work to just purchase BTC.  Participating in the system (mining, node operation, etc) would be to me a thing to do as/when the system needs it.  As larger pools take over and engage in practices I don't like, that is the time to get active.

As mentioned, if mining trends toward zero profitability, and one is only competing on such things as energy costs, suplementation from other sources becomes a big or dominant factor in profitability.  It's why they will mine trash into the blockchain so it seems...and such has been predicted since the early days.  The basis for my(*) idea is to do the same form of supplementation and in favor of miners who are doing things I agree.  Esp, being independent and autonomous.  One of them would certainly includes applying filter sets which I agree with.  Call it 'fighting fire with fire'.

From my recent research, it seems like mempool coherence is one of the things which 'core' would like to work toward, and for understandable reasons.  My(*) 'games' (which include increased use of filter sets) would probably fuck that up.  This is lamentable, but in my mind kind of in the same category as the pragmatic arguments they are making about aspects of the OP_RETURN limits.

* I doubt that they are 'my' ideas and they are very basic and obvious even if they are.  It is the case, though, that I have held some of them for a long time, and some of them account for my rather unusual views that it's OK if on-chain fees are super high and there are subtle advantages of having the system be 'inefficient', slow, and unpredictable.


For my part, I would tend to prefer to foster solo miners (who maintain their own blockchains and mempools.)  To the extent that they formed a 'pool', it would not really be in the same category as most.  The service itself need not be non-profit.  It would mostly just needs to have high quality transparency to give users and miners the confidence to use it.

I don't see a danger in the transactions being picked up (or mined) by generally dis-favored miners since there is little reason for them to do so, and if they for some reason did, great.

For a lot of (but not all of) the on-chain transactions I perform, it really doesn't matter to me how fast they are mined (within reason.)  Or even if they fail completely in some recoverable way.  It's been a philosophy of mine since the GPU days that reward is always going to approach zero so, in financial terms, it's as effective and a lot less work to just purchase BTC.  Participating in the system (mining, node operation, etc) would be to me a thing to do as/when the system needs it.  As larger pools take over and engage in practices I don't like, that is the time to get active.

As mentioned, if mining trends toward zero profitability, and one is only competing on such things as energy costs, suplementation from other sources becomes a big or dominant factor in profitability.  It's why they will mine trash into the blockchain so it seems...and such has been predicted since the early days.  The basis for my(*) idea is to do the same form of supplementation and in favor of miners who are doing things I agree.  Esp, being independent and autonomous.  One of them would certainly includes applying filter sets which I agree with.  Call it 'fighting fire with fire'.

From my recent research, it seems like mempool coherence is one of the things which 'core' would like to work toward, and for understandable reasons.  My(*) 'games' (which include increased use of filter sets) would probably fuck that up.  This is lamentable, but in my mind kind of in the same category as the pragmatic arguments they are making about aspects of the OP_RETURN limits.

* I doubt that they are 'my' ideas and they are very basic and obvious even if they are.  It is the case, though, that I have held some of them for a long time, and some of them account for my rather unusual views that it's OK if on-chain fees are super high and there are subtle advantages of having the system be 'inefficient', slow, and unpredictable.


For my part, I would tend to prefer to foster solo miners (who maintain their own blockchains and mempools.)  To the extent that they formed a 'pool', it would not really be in the same category as most.  The service itself need not be non-profit.  It would mostly just needs to have high quality transparency to give users and miners the confidence to use it.

I don't see a danger in the transactions being picked up (or mined) by generally dis-favored miners since there is little reason for them to do so, and if they for some reason did, great.

For a lot of (but not all of) the on-chain transactions I perform, it really doesn't matter to me how fast they are mined (within reason.)  Or even if they fail completely in some recoverable way.  It's been a philosophy of mine since the GPU days that reward is always going to approach zero so, in financial terms, it's as effective and a lot less work to just purchase BTC.  Participating in the system (mining, node operation, etc) would be to me a thing to do as/when the system needs it.  As larger pools take over and engage in practices I don't like, that is the time to get active.

As mentioned, if mining trends toward zero profitability, and one is only competing on such things as energy costs, suplementation from other sources becomes a big or dominant factor in profitability.  It's why they will mine trash into the blockchain so it seems...and such has been predicted since the early days.  The basis for my(*) idea is to do the same form of supplementation and in favor of miners who are doing things I agree.  Esp, being independent and autonomous.  One of them would certainly includes applying filter sets which I agree with.  Call it 'fighting fire with fire'.

From my recent research, it seems like mempool coherence is one of the things which 'core' would like to work toward, and for understandable reasons.  My(*) 'games' (which include increased use of filter sets) would probably fuck that up.  This is lamentable, but in my mind kind of in the same category as the pragmatic arguments they are making about aspects of the OP_RETURN limits.

* I doubt that they are 'my' ideas and they are very basic and obvious even if they are.  It is the case, though, that I have held some of them for a long time, and some of them account for my rather unusual views that it's OK if on-chain fees are super high and there are subtle advantages of having the system be 'inefficient', slow, and unpredictable.


For my part, I would tend to prefer to foster solo miners (who maintain their own blockchains and mempools.  To the extent that they formed a 'pool', it would not really be in the same category as most.  The service itself need not be non-profit.  It would mostly just needs to have high quality transparency to give users and miners the confidence to use it.