Thanks for the example with "1000000 OP_CHECKLOCKTIMEVERIFY OP_DROP OP_TRUE". I briefly thought would be possible to be claimed by a non-miner user too, but this transaction would simply be double-spent by the miner mining that block, so you're correct imo. I still think doing this via transaction fees would be cleaner.
The proposal would probably lead to a more stable hashrate even in periods with low onchain activity, so miners should support the proposal also for their own good to make it more predictable. However, maybe 210000 blocks is too long for that period in which the miners "renounce" to a part of their fees. That could of course be optimized.
Regarding your other comment, the problem is that there are always swings in the amount of transaction fees. They may be seasonal or caused by waves of data transactions (Ordinals). And that would make hashrate potentially unstable, or incentive miners to create spam fads.
And we could see it also that way: Block rewards that add more coins to the supply (like the current rewards) only dilute the coins of the Bitcoin holders making them less valuable. In reality, it's all about psychology. We feel better if we can say we have "1 BTC" and not "1/19,870,000 of the current Bitcoin supply".
Your demurrage idea is nevertheless interesting, just because of the psychology. Thanks! I'll later perhaps comment on it.
I think also @satoshifan44 has a point that for the market situation a confiscation of old coins would be very similar to a "honest" tail emission with supply increase. However, just the "semantics" are important, see my answer to @odolvlobo.
NameCoin implemented Merged Mining in a wrong way, because it is possible to do 51% attack on NameCoin, even if you cannot do 51% attack on Bitcoin. They should trace the heaviest chain of double SHA-256 headers, and calculate the global difficulty, based on that. Instead, they have their own difficulty, which is one of their mistakes.
Ah, thanks. That's really interesting Would miner prefer to have more reward in future, rather than now?
If the protocol prevented them from grabbing that "burnt" part of the transaction fee, then they would not have this option. Or maybe you refer to the possibility that miners could reject that soft/hardfork? I think in this case everything would depend on the signalled support from economic nodes.The proposal would probably lead to a more stable hashrate even in periods with low onchain activity, so miners should support the proposal also for their own good to make it more predictable. However, maybe 210000 blocks is too long for that period in which the miners "renounce" to a part of their fees. That could of course be optimized.
Regarding your other comment, the problem is that there are always swings in the amount of transaction fees. They may be seasonal or caused by waves of data transactions (Ordinals). And that would make hashrate potentially unstable, or incentive miners to create spam fads.
Merged mining also can be done with Bitcoin layers rather than altcoin. On theory, Bitcoiner would use of one of those Bitcoin layers to make TX with lower fee and faster confirmation. But Rootstock proved it's unpopular option among Bitcoiner.
I think RSK has also the problem that they are considered a centralized entity (instead of a real decentralized sidechain) due to their federation model, and thus they aren't that popular.Imagine that your employer says to you, "In order to motivate you, we are going to hold half of your salary for 4 years."
See my answer to ABCbits.Also, consider the steady state -- the amount burned during the current period is the same as the amount paid to you from the previous period. The two cancel each other.
Yes, but that's exactly the idea And we could see it also that way: Block rewards that add more coins to the supply (like the current rewards) only dilute the coins of the Bitcoin holders making them less valuable. In reality, it's all about psychology. We feel better if we can say we have "1 BTC" and not "1/19,870,000 of the current Bitcoin supply".
Your demurrage idea is nevertheless interesting, just because of the psychology. Thanks! I'll later perhaps comment on it.
I still feel that confiscating stale addresses is what will be done.
I think this would not solve the problem entirely. The supply which could be "reinserted into circulation" from these stale addresses by paying them to miners would be probably lower every year, as most stale addresses are from Bitcoin's early period (mostly 2009-11).I think also @satoshifan44 has a point that for the market situation a confiscation of old coins would be very similar to a "honest" tail emission with supply increase. However, just the "semantics" are important, see my answer to @odolvlobo.