Quote from: Satofan44 on Today at 08:35:30 PM

Quote from: headingnorth on Today at 06:12:39 PM

Quote from: Amph on June 13, 2025, 12:41:07 PM

Anything about addressing the migration for countering quantum computer? Are we waiting 2030?

The NIST have already released quantum-resistant replacements for the SHA-256 and EDCSA encryption used by bitcoin.
They are called FIPS 203, 204, 205. NIST is the US federal agency that originally created SHA and EDCSA encryption methods.

NIST Releases First 3 Finalized Post-Quantum Encryption Standards

• NIST has released a final set of encryption tools designed to withstand the attack of a quantum computer.
• These post-quantum encryption standards secure a wide range of electronic information, from confidential
email messages to e-commerce transactions that propel the modern economy.
• NIST is encouraging computer system administrators to begin transitioning to the new standards as soon as possible.

The question is, if and when the devs will start implementing them into bitcoin?

The general view is that this field is still in its emergence and that more changes will come. Bitcoin is not the kind of technology that allows for making fatal errors with minimal consequences. The consequences of adopting the wrong algorithm could be devastating. Keep in mind that knowledge in this field is still lacking, i.e., there are too many unknowns. What seems secure today could become insecure tomorrow as quantum computers actually start getting used and we discover new ways of attacking encryption and hashes. Anyhow, some of these algorithms may be rejected for different reasons here but they may be useful somewhere else. Decentralized systems have different limitations and restrictions than centralized systems.

Furthermore, Bitcoin is generally a very slow mover. I'd expect at least a few more years to pass before we start considering some "final candidates" for our replacements. Note that I am talking about final candidates for Bitcoin, not final candidates as given by NIST. Unless something forces us to act faster.

That makes sense. One of the questions concerning the process of future-proofing bitcoin
to me would be how to protect legacy addresses from a quantum attack, addresses where
the private keys may have been permanently lost.

Potential solutions:

1. Provide plenty of warning and time for people to move their bitcoin before permanently
"locking" legacy addresses. Of course, doing that would be highly controversial.

2. Do the above, but provide a means for the owner of a locked legacy address to prove
ownership by "signing" the bitcoin and restoring their access. I have no idea if that would even be possible.

3. Something else