Next scheduled rescrape ... never
Version 1
Last scraped
Scraped on 21/07/2025, 06:03:22 UTC
I ended up opening a GitHub codespaces and directing Claude 4 to rebuild the .dat file. It analyzed it and did a bunch of tests then rebuilt it and it was no longer corrupt.
Well, it's rather simple to "fix" it by deriving the correct extended (master) public key pair of the extended (master) private key in the wallet.
And replace the fake extended public key with it.

But if the goal is to keep the high-value transactions brought by the fake extended public key:
It's not possible to compute its extended private key pair with traditional computing unless it's just commented out there somewhere in the wallet.
And why would a malware corrupt a wallet that it can decrypt to insert some JSON instead of stealingusing the fundsprivKey to spend the bitcoins?

1. Wallet -> Info -> Standard, BIP39, Seed, Master Pub Key visible... Derivation path: m
-snip- to rebuild the .dat file.
Interesting...
Original archived Re: problems broadcasting on possibly corruped backup file
Scraped on 21/07/2025, 05:58:32 UTC
I ended up opening a GitHub codespaces and directing Claude 4 to rebuild the .dat file. It analyzed it and did a bunch of tests then rebuilt it and it was no longer corrupt.
Well, it's rather simple to "fix" it by deriving the correct extended (master) public key pair of the extended (master) private key in the wallet.
And replace the fake extended public key with it.

But if the goal is to keep the high-value transactions brought by the fake extended public key:
It's not possible to compute its extended private key pair with traditional computing unless it's just commented out there somewhere in the wallet.
And why would a malware corrupt a wallet that it can decrypt to insert some JSON instead of stealing the funds?

1. Wallet -> Info -> Standard, BIP39, Seed, Master Pub Key visible... Derivation path: m
-snip- to rebuild the .dat file.
Interesting...