Quote from: smooth on May 13, 2014, 06:11:31 AM

So I would respectfully request that you guys take it over to the Economics subforum or somewhere else a bit more focused. There are MRO-specific topics to discuss here.

Due to the medium to long term focus of our discussion, and the short-term focus of building a positive community in light of an unrelenting torrent of drama since the day the coin was released due to reasons outside anyone's direct control, I must defer to Smooth's logic. Let's the conversation be lightened so as to not stamp out one of the few brighter horizons with such heavy issues simply because we couldn't find better spaces in which to discuss.

Quote from: AnonyMint on May 13, 2014, 01:47:16 AM

I raised similar issues last year as follows.

Transactions Withholding Attack

"Spiraling Transaction Fees Destruction" of bitcoin (Transactions fees are a Tragedy of the Commons)

Thanks for the update, it will again take me some time to take in and digest the information presented. I had just begun to make a few steps on the other issue you presented. A bit of looking has put me on something that I was alluding to as well, because I'm willing to accept that both TOR and I2P are not reliable. TOR specifically for reasons you've presented in the past, I'm still working on understanding I2P.

Quote from: Keyboard-Mash

I would imagine it to be aimed at something much more main-stream than a cryptocurrency. Like an email system or some other sort of messaging system would seem a much more valid proof of concept

In trying to explain myself I came across an enlightening article today. As usual I don't yet have the full basis to understand the concepts, but I think this relates pretty well:
http://www.defenseone.com/technology/2014/05/what-most-secure-email-universe-would-look/84247/

The paper linked in that article is here:
http://arxiv.org/pdf/1404.7347v1.pdf

In searching for anonymity on top of privacy, it seems that low probability of detection communication can be better leveraged than the tunneling solutions that I've seen presented. The amount of data that can be transferred is extremely low, but the process seems quite a walk in the right direction if one were to be seeking anonymity on top of privacy.

Quote from: Patrick Tucker

While there is no way to share a secret code in an invisible email, there is a way to share it in an encrypted email that would destroy itself if viewed by an outsider. Using quantum encryption, you could send a message between two parties containing the deciphering key and that message, while detectable, would also be unhackable.

University of Oxford quantum physicist Artur Ekert calls quantum encryption the ultimate physical limits of privacy. Other key distribution schemes such as the Diffie Hellman scheme, rely on the difficulty of mathematical problems to work, whereas quantum encryption does not. According to Heisenbergs uncertainty principle, objects viewed on the atomically small quantum scale change their behavior when viewed. Quantum encryption offers the possibility of a message so secure that any attempt to read it without authorization will destroy it, not because of some programmers whim but because of the way subatomic particles operate.

For quantum cryptography we need only to transit quantum particles over a certain distance, and this is relatively easy. Quantum cryptography has been demonstrated in practice and there are even companies that can sell it to you, Ekert told Defense One.

Quantum cryptography and Bashs pulse position modulation technique are two very different animals. Cryptography makes messages difficult to decipher and pulse position modulation cloaks them so that they cant be detected. But Bashs method could go hand-in-hand with something like quantum key distribution, which a message sender would use in advance to share the key code. That, in turn, would be used in the future for covert communication.

Heres what the most secure electronic message exchange in the history of humanity would like: You would first exchange the code key in a quantum encrypted message, and then, when the receiver and the sender both had the code, they could exchange an invisible thus perfectly secure message. A third party might be able to detect that two parties had exchanged a single message that had been quantum encrypted, containing the key code, but that third party wouldnt be able to see any of the exchanges that passed after that or open the key code message.

Can this be applied to a cryptocurrency protocol, or would one have to be re-written around it?