Quote from: darkota on July 20, 2014, 03:36:38 PM

XC also has a premine.

It's "anonymity" is also coinjoin based and the mixers are the user's wallets, so if a malicious entity of agency decided to see through XC's anonymity, they would simply have to create a large amount of wallets for themselves, so that most coins would be redirected to their wallets, and theyll see transactions as clear as day.... along with the fact that in the beginning its "anonymity" was unraveled by Chaeplin (Read XC Unmoderated Thread, where XC's coin mixing wasnt working at all)

Quote from: btc-mike on July 20, 2014, 07:16:15 PM

Quote from: Este Nuno on July 20, 2014, 06:25:04 PM

Quote

(a) Use end-to-end encryption to support transaction broadcasting, secure messaging, and true P2P anonymous transactions.
(b) Upon this is built an optional mixer that testing has shown to eliminate any record in the blockchain of a link between sender and receiver.
(c) This mixer is a revolutionary multi-path implementation that employs multi-sig to route fragments of transactions down separate paths through the network, compounding anonymity while adding redundancy and security.
(d) Communication between nodes is optionally via TOR, which obfuscates users IP addresses.

Emphasis mine. Legit new tech or same old CoinJoin?

Mixers function is similar to DRK masternodes.

To chip in here, XC doesn't employ a coinjoin strategy.

XC also doesn't have anything akin to masternodes.

XC is completely decentralised, and due to trustless mixing there is no need to have a hefty pile of coins to start a masternode. As Gregory Maxwell stated, this is a "security chokepoint" and we have no interest in such a strategy.

It is also incorrect that Chaeplin unravelled XC's anonymity. In fact, he partially failed to understand what was being tested, and was unable to show any link on the blockchain between sender and receiver. Here's the post where all this happened.

Now that this has been cleared up, here's how XC works:

1) user initiates a transaction

2) wallet requests to send fragments of the transaction to other nodes via end-to-end-encrypted tunnels. (The latter is the Xnode protocol, the former is known as multipath.)

3) multisig between each participating node is set up and passed around for signing

4) multisig enables trust-less transactions as any changes to the signed transaction (ie: a node trying to steal coins) makes the multi-signature invalid

- it's not coinjoin, because its not centralised or semi-centralised. There's nothing akin to masternodes in XC either.

- it's not a ring signature because it's multidirectional

5) if a bad node fails to forward a transaction, then several other paths exist and the tx is sent along one of them instead

6) fragments sent to nodes

7) nodes mix and forward fragments from different addresses to the ones they receive fragments on

Cool

recipient receives transaction

This is a sketch of the world's first trustless mixer.

In other words, henceforth you can pay someone through a third party without having to trust the third party.

I'm sure you'll appreciate the magnitude of this development.