Quote from: gmaxwell on March 19, 2012, 01:37:11 PM

Quote from: da2ce7 on March 19, 2012, 09:18:06 AM

a type of web-of-trust), that provides a lower grade of security, but at a much lower cost (so we can afford a very large quantity), is good for the 2nd line of defence, that we use against 51% attacks

However I do not agree that the proof-of-work is made irrelevant by the proof-of-stake idea. Rather I think that they provide solutions to different problems.

The fundamental problem here is that these things are not generally additive: An action which causes different nodes to follow different chains is a forking attack which may be fatal to Bitcoin.

Say you have two distinct perfect security measures: A and B. They both do a nearly perfect job of selecting the best chain. But they are distinct and can select different chains. Some users use A and some use B (or some A, some B some A&B) then an attacker just has to do something to make them differ that something may even hardly be an attack and then Bitcoin is forked in a way which is irreparably without manual intervention. Rapidly people will double spend on each of the forks and within a dozen blocks or two any repair will be a difficult selection of which of two enormous groups of people gets robbed more.

Even the cases where the node just shuts down in response to reorgs which is much better than the above still is no help. In a sane attack the reorg you see is the reorg moving you back onto the real chain by the time you get any evidence that something is wrong it's too late. You can't ignore that reorg without forever losing the ability to trade with everyone else. The shutdown just helps you avoid getting exploited again shortly thereafter. But even that isn't much help because at the same time you've exposed yourself to a nice DOS that you were immune to before. If miners adopt software that shuts down on reorgs then all sorts of great force multiplying attacks happen where you get >50% active hash power when you really have much less, just by first getting luck enough to trigger a big enough reorg to knock miners offline.

Both of the proposed implementations of PoS (Cunicula's and Meni's) are combined with PoW. In Cunicula's system, difficulty is adjusted by stake, such that a miner with a higher stake gets to use a lower difficulty for PoW. Meni's system uses straight PoW, but PoS is used independently to verify certain checkpoint blocks that the whole network can fall back on in case of a dispute.

The main disadvantage of Cunicula's system is that only a single miner signs each block, which makes it hard/impossible for decentralized pools to contribute. Also, the way his system weighs stake doesn't allow for the "trustworthiness" of signatures to be gauged based on how many blocks they have contributed or any other relevant figures. It also has the unintended side effect that having a larger stake leads to a higher chance of generating a block (and thus collecting the coins from it).

The main disadvantage of Meni's system is that signature blocks can be signed by anyone with a stake, so each checkpoint block might end up with millions of signatures. This also makes it hard to provide any incentive for signing.

I had the idea to have the contributors of each pool sign the blocks it creates, and then only signatures that appear on previous blocks can be used on checkpoint blocks, each weighted by, say, the number of blocks the sig appears on and the amount of BTC in the signing account. That would prevent a 51% attack unless the attacker both had 51% of the computing power and a huge stake, and it would take a considerable amount of time for their signatures to gain the weight needed to overthrow the main blockchain. The main problem is figuring out how to keep the size of signatures down as in Meni's system.

Another thing that occurs to me is that, in the thread on tx replacement, it was briefly mentioned that a new protocol rule could be included that would invalidate any block containing a double spend attempt. If there is any conceivable way that a 51% or other forking attack could be used to effect a (very large) double spend, then a protocol rule would invalidate that chain automatically even if it does happen to be longer. They would be limited to DoS, or they would have to put most of the other miners out of business before the network would accept their attack (if at all). In that case, the network (and bitcoin) would probably be destroyed (if the clients still throw flags) before a double spend would succeed. As long as there's some contingency for a major DoS attack, it shouldn't be a major issue, however.