Quote from: timerland on August 16, 2014, 07:33:37 PM

Quote from: synechist on August 16, 2014, 07:31:01 PM

Man, I head out to enjoy my weekend and come back to this mess?

Again, you guys need to work on your civility.

Now, let's play join-the-dots:

1) I posted the following a little earlier:

Quote from: synechist on August 16, 2014, 10:08:05 AM

Quote from: timerland on August 16, 2014, 12:47:03 AM

Can anyone show me XC's multisig addresses and their associated transactions?

Would these satisfy your curiosity?
- http://chainz.cryptoid.info/xc/block.dws?62014.htm
- http://chainz.cryptoid.info/xc/tx.dws?229177.htm

You're an arse for fudding instead of just downloading the wallet and trying out Privacy Mode.

Quote

m-of-m multisig? Are you drunk? What fun will you have to have m-of-m multisig?? If one guy is bad then you want the wallet is locked forever?

So, your reasoning process:
- timerland doesn't understand the point of m-of-m multisig.

- timerland doesn't bother to ask people from XC what m-of-m is used for.

- timerland simply concludes, with the foolhardiness of a drunk pullet, that the truth is not that he lacks understanding but that XC is a scam.

You're not very civil are you?

Just come and ask us questions next time instead of creating a fruitless and irritating FUD thread.

If you have further questions, you're welcome to ask, nicely.

2) ATCSECURE, XC's core dev, posted the following not too long ago:

Quote from: atcsecure on August 16, 2014, 06:47:23 PM

They are mixing apples and oranges, XC is trustless based on the signatures of all parties during the private transaction. Its not using MULTI_SIG N OF M Address's.

The transactions are SIGNED BY ALL PARTIES, if any of the outputs are missing, then it is not signed by all parties.

Here is an example of a private decentralized distributed multi-path transaction consisting of 4 parties. >>> http://chainz.cryptoid.info/xc/tx.dws?229236.htm

3) Supplementary information:

- XC's multipath technology, used for obfuscating the amount sent in a transaction and the identity of sender and receiver, makes use of m-of-m transactions in order to achieve trustless mixing.

- Trustless mixing is a world-first. Nobody's ever done it before. Hence my prior request that you ask questions before coming to conclusions.

- m-of-m requires that all parties sign or else the transaction is invalidated.

- As such, m-of-m prevents bad nodes stealing coins instead of forwarding them.

- if a transaction is invalidated, the participating nodes resync the session-based network they form for the transaction in question, and proceed.

4) Conclusion:

- You might've guessed this before - though your intentions evidently have barricaded you from this surprisingly obvious conclusion - but XC DOES NOT USE MULTI_SIG M-OF-N.

- So you're looking for something that I've already stated (see above post) that XC does not use. All this talk of addresses beginning with a 4, condescending offers to explain multisig, etc. refer to the wrong thing.

- I refer you to the latter half of my previous post: timerland needs to ask questions before coming to conclusions about a technology he doesn't understand.

- If you don't get the point of m-of-m transactions, then stop talking and listen. Idiots.

- You can start listening this weekend. ATCSECURE releases a whitepaper explaining how all this works.

And if you speak again, kindly be civil, for heaven's sake.

people already showed you what you posted do not have a single multisig address. What your links for??

we ask some simple info and you provided something complete different. Please answer the simple question, and don't post ton of unrelated info to confuse people.

moreover, now I see you changed m-of-m multisig to n-of-m multisig, lol, learned something new? can you show me how you plan to use m-of-m multisig? You apparently have no knowledge on what is a multisig at all!

If you like, we can rehash how n-of-m multisig can have bad actors/nodes and steal coins. XC solves this issue. I believe you started a whole new thread after 500 pages because of the talk of this issue. Do you want to play... are you sure?