Quote from: rpietila on September 07, 2014, 08:20:52 PM

Quote from: Anotheranonlol on September 07, 2014, 03:10:21 PM

Quote from: DieJohnny on September 07, 2014, 03:30:34 AM

Quote from: rpietila on September 06, 2014, 10:47:38 PM

It is a kiss of DEATH to Bitcoin if some "there" try to quench the "competition".

The Monero camp is composed of large Bitcoin holders and if we collectively withdraw our support, at this point it means a steep dive for Bitcoin.

I did not even mention the possibility that other honest bitcoiners might also want to switch allegiance. I know there are many. Bitcoin attracts scammers but also honest people.

Seriously...... I am trying to understand what you are saying, but it seems you are suggesting that a few big bitcoin holders can collectively tank Bitcoin. If this is the case, then Bitcoin is the biggest scam ever.

Prisoners dilemma

It's a not so thinly veiled threat. In short; What is being alluded to is since XMR camp is composed of large BTC holders, if certain competing CN groups attempt to attack XMR, the XMR camp will strike back by driving the value of BTC down (which generally crashes the value of all alts) , not to mention your 'unrealised' gains in fiat from whatever BTC you might happen to own.

Well, not quite what I was thinking. But the actual thought is difficult to express...

Let's say that the market cap of a coin is the measure of the trust that people collectively have towards the coin. If coin X costs $1, and people A, B, C, and D own it 4, 3, 2, and 1 units respectively, the market cap equals $10. This much money the people are willing to trust to be held in this coin.

If someone, let's say A, decided that his trust towards the coin has increased, and instead of $4, he wants to allocate $5 of his portfolio to the coin, he can go to market and buy more until his position is valued $5.

If the action happens without significant new emission (mining) happening meanwhile, A must buy from either B, C, or D. If one of them (eg. B) has listed a coin for sale at the previous price for whatever reason, A can express his increased trust with no change in market price (it was offset by the actualization of the latent decreased trust of B).

But if no one directly wants to sell their coins, A must bid higher to obtain them. If the others are strict with their decision to trust only $3, $2 and $1, respectively, worth of value to the coin, they sell when their coins exceed that value. In a case where they did just that, the following would happen as a result of one person deciding to trust the coin a little bit more:

- coin market value would increase by 10%
- A would hold 4.55 coins valued at $5
- B would hold 2.73 coins valued at $3
- C would hold 1.82 coins valued at $2
- D would hold 0.91 coins valued at $1
- a total of 0.55 coins have been sold to A for $0.60.

A paid only $0.6 to have his stack valued up $1, and others got free money + their stack is worth the same. Not bad!

In reality people often have more rigid price flexibility in this kind of situations, which means that they don't sell so eagerly. This means that price goes up even quicker, and the pursuit to trust $5 becomes easier.

OK - but the same works both ways. Let everything else be the same (ceteris paribus), but this time A has lost some, 25% to be exact, trust towards the coin, and wants to reflect his lessened trust so that his investment is no more worth $4 but $3. What happens?

Without a coincidence of someone wanting to simultaneously increase trust, A has to push the price down to meet the neutral reaction by the others ("X has come down, so it's good to buy low" - this reflects their willingness to trust the equal amount of $ in the coin regardless of fluctuations).

To reduce A's exposure in the coin to $3, the following happens:

- coin market value would decrease by 10%
- A would hold 3.33 coins valued at $3
- B would hold 3.33 coins valued at $3
- C would hold 2.22 coins valued at $2
- D would hold 1.11 coins valued at $1
- a total of 0.67 coins have been sold by A for $0.60.

I will continue soon, this is messy to explain...

I think I got your examples, but not sure I followed the thought process completely.

An example with 2 seperate coins, let's call them B and X. Let's assume X has lower market cap than B. and let's just assume they have been fully distributed as per your example.

If you had holdings of those 2, and wanted to give a helping hand to carry out the second scenario in your example on Coin B as 'punishment' for perceived attacks on coin X- to demonstrate you have lost trust, the only way it would make sense is if you imagine your gains in coin X will offset the losses you incurred from whatever coin B is measured in, right? - (even if those 'losses' in B may only be temporary.) because coin X is denominated in coin B.

But you wouldn't be putting downward selling pressure on coin B in order to buy coin X, as there is no need to sell B for what it's measured in to buy X, when you can outright swap Coin B for coin X (again , since coin X is measured IN coin B)

unless you imagine that people are not measuring the price of coin X in coin B but instead by another metric, (like perhaps the same metric coin B is measured in), and so the loss of worth, from 'loss of trust' of Coin B will have no negative impact on your profit in coin X, and actually result in increasing the ratio of Coin B/ Coin X.

(in the same way a gain of trust in Coin X would increase the ratio of Coin B/ Coin X, even without a decrease in trust in coin B.)

except the increased trust in coin X would result in proportionally bigger gains for existing holders, considering the market caps, and decreased trust in B would result in proportionally bigger losses in Coin B?

Am i following or on another planet?