1. Craig said he signed a hash of some Sartre document but did not disclose which portion of the text. No one has written a script to prove that no portion or combination of portions of that Sartre text will not hash to the value that was signed. Thus I stated until someone has proven that it is impossible for Craig to later show that some portion of the Sartre text will hash to the sign hash value, then you can't claim with certainty that he can't do that. At the bare minimum, those who were checking Craig's proof, should have at least run a simple script to try every contiguous portion (no permutations) of the Sartre text (which is a tractable computation).
Such a script would prove nothing, since you know nothing about the input Craig allegedly used.
If we are basing it on the drcraigwright.com website "proof", then the Sartre document is the one claimed to have been hashed, but he didn't disclose what portion of that document.
Nice try. Fail.
My point is the you Bitcoin zealots didn't do your homework. Haha. You also didn't even validate if that was his official website. You guys are derelict, as well as censoring free speech and technical discussion. No wonder you will end up in failure mindlessly following Blockstream's SegWit soft forking Trojan Horse.
2. I have stated that no one seems to know why Bitcoin employs double hashing, and I have stated a theory that double hashing may weaken the collision resistance of the SHA256. I gave my logic for why that may be the case. I also note that SHA256 is documented to be reasonably close to being broken with 46 - 52 of the 64 rounds already broken. Thus I presented the theory that perhaps the double-hashing might push the vulnerability over the edge of breakage of 64 rounds. I didn't present that as a likely theory. I presented it as a point of discussion. If you have no way to refute this technical possibility because you don't know a damn thing about cryptographic hash function construction then that means you are not expert enough to comment about the quality of my theory. Do you for example even understand why two SHA256 hash function applications in series is not equivalent to 2 x 64 rounds? I ask you a specific question and I expect a specific answer.
Because double hashing is routinely employed to avoid preimage and length extension attacks, whether such protection is needed or not. Multiple iterations do not make it more vulnerable (again, if you believe it does, it's up to
you to produce evidence of such a vulnerability), so there's no downside except for a slight reduction in performance.
I asked you a specific question, "Do you for example even understand why two SHA256 hash function applications in series is not equivalent to 2 x 64 rounds?". I see you are unable to answer it?
After we confirm that you can't answer it, then I will REKT the rest of your technically incorrect response above.
No, it isn't. It would a problem if I
did like you, since anyone who does must be a poor judge of character.
Try reading the linked article to learn more about your character.