Re: WasabiWallet.io | Open-source, non-custodial Bitcoin Wallet for desktop
They sacrifice your privacy (as well as block space/transaction fees) by forcing you to do a tx0 transaction before coinjoining
This just isn't true at all. If you willing sacrifice your privacy by consolidating inputs prior to going anywhere near a coinjoin, then that's on you. This has nothing to do with Samourai at all. You could quite easily sacrifice your privacy by consolidating inputs prior to using Wasabi, or JoinMarket, or Bisq, or any other service.Please refer to my example, there is no smaller pool than .001 BTC, and the leftover output is worth .0001 (minus tx and pool fees ofc).
Cool. So swap it for Monero or Lightning.This leaks your premix transaction history to your swap partner. You know what's even easier than that? A coinjoin making all of your Bitcoins private like Wasabi does without extra steps, extra layers, or extra shitcoins.
Good thing you can perform these swaps anonymously then. I mean, actually anonymously, not Wasabi "anonymously" which requires the permission of a surveillance company. 
You're lying, and everyone can see you are lying - Here's the exact quote of what I said: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5286821.msg62067607#msg62067607
You can argue semantics all you like - saying it is unlikely that provides Whirlpool "any anonymity at all" is just plain false.If I'm wrong, show everyone proof that the clients used by all 5 inputs and outputs in this Whirlpool transaction are using Tor and their own node instead of sending someone else's node their xpub
You seem to be confused about how burden of proof works. If you make a claim that all the inputs have leaked their xpub, then it's on you to prove that claim. You can't go around making wild claims and say "Disprove my unsubstantiated bullshit!"This is a lie, all of your addresses and UTXOs are prevented from being linked to each other by blockchain analysis because Wasabi uses client side block filters to discover your wallet balance from the network.
And then hands your addresses and UTXOs straight to blockchain analysis surveillance company for investigation and approval.This blockchain analysis would only be possible in Samourai wallet and Sparrow wallet
Right. So the entities which aren't working hand in hand with blockchain analysis companies are more susceptible to blockchain analysis than the entity literally using your coinjoin fees to pay blockchain analysis companies to analyse your UTXOs. Lmao. I'm sure even you don't believe that, but good job repeating the party line.No, it's not okay, which is why exactly Wasabi generates a new receive address for every transaction.
So I guess all the address reuse with blockchain evidence which I've linked to is just a figment of my imagination?So for the record: You were not able to identify the input that created an output without other matching values in address bc1qrmmypw3g2ds4aqgh3nqc59qhdp9qk779x2zlru which proves your previous claim of "you don't need to be a 'whale' at all in order to receive absolutely zero privacy from a Wasabi coinjoin" to be false.
Good job ignoring my examples. That seems to be a recurring theme here. 
So in summary, coinjoins that don't work, that you need to permission to join at all, heyprovided by a company which uses your money to pay blockchain analysis companies to spy on you.