Whale outputs that don't receive privacy on the blockchain aren't displayed as private in the client either, what's your point? Where's the flaw? You're not providing a criticism against WabiSabi coinjoins at all, your criticism is that amounts on Bitcoin are not cryptographically blinded, which means a larger amount cannot be hidden within a smaller amount no matter what coinjoin protocol is used. Period.
You keep repeating this and I keep having to direct you to the Bitcoin whitepaper:
Here's the Bitcoin whitepaper again since you seemed to miss it the first time I posted it:
Everyone already knows you shouldn't reuse addresses, it's in the Bitcoin whitepaper:
As an additional firewall, a new key pair should be used for each transaction to keep them from being linked to a common owner. Some linking is still unavoidable with multi-input transactions, which necessarily reveal that their inputs were owned by the same owner. The risk is that if the owner of a key is revealed, linking could reveal other transactions that belonged to the same owner.
For you then to provide a single example which works well does absolutely nothing to address the fact in many cases Wasabi coinjoins are critically flawed. As per my previous analogy, a car manufacturer showing a new model which works well does not excuse previous models which have randomly burst in to flames. This is an incredibly simple concept, so I can only assume you are trolling by continuing to deliberately misunderstand it.
Go on, tell me how Wasabi coinjoins are "critically flawed". Don't hold back, I want to know what's wrong with them.
Again, you are repeating a malicious lie. Wasabi users cannot be surveilled because their wallet addresses are masked by client side block filters and their IP address is masked with Tor.
Yes yes, you've repeated this meaningless soundbite a dozen times now.
You pay a blockchain analysis company for information on every single UTXO which attempts to register for a coinjoin. You actively support mass surveillance.
Why does it matter if a coordinator buys data from someone else? The objective of a privacy wallet is to prevent the coordinator from
SELLING their data. It's possible for the coordinator to collect and sell blockchain data for Samourai, Joinmarket, and all the custodial mixers you have promoted in your signature, but
coordinators of Wasabi coinjoins cannot surveil their users thanks to default usage of Tor and client side block filters.