Полностью согласен с комментарием.

Замечание только по 3-му пункту. Не вижу больших отличий. Нельзя так просто взять и присоединиться к LN. Как минимум, партнер, с кем вы бы хотели создать канал, должен дать вам свое согласие, то есть разрешение. 

Все приведенные цифры - это изменение за МЕСЯЦ, а не за день. И никакого отношения к твиттеру не имеют.
Наоборот, рост количества активных нод поднимался до 10% за месяц, но в последнее время снижается и на текущий момент где-то на уровне 6% за месяц.

"an attack vector, that would possibly disrupt the network"- isn't that"breaking the system"? 

The miner can increase its income due to the fact that users will pay a large commission for the transaction. This can be achieved by reducing the block. Or by setting a high commission for the right to be included in the block. And the miners ALREADY have such an opportunity. Miners can set any commission they want. To do this, they do not need to "fake demand".

A couple of years ago, a delusional idea was popular that miners fill blocks with their transactions (fake  demand) in order to artificially increase the mempool and thus earn more commissions. Miners ALREADY have such an opportunity.   

Delusional ideas die very hard.

This is what miners can do now . The main mining pools can strategically exclude others from their exclusive "subnet" by simply broadcasting a new block only among themselves, and transmitting it to the general network with some delay. If it was profitable. Judging by the fact that this is not being done, the miners do not have any benefit from this. Or they do not want to do this for the sake of a minimal increase in income. Any activity of this kind is a loss of Bitcoin's reputation, which will eventually lead to much greater losses.

1. It is worth noting that the speed of distribution of blocks in general on the network does not play a special role for mining. The main thing is what is the speed of distribution of blocks within the subnet that covers miners. If the speed inside the subnet was at the level of 1 second, we would have ~1.6% of orphan blocks. But there are much fewer orphan blocks at the moment. Somewhere on the forum, a figure of 0.0024% was given (I can't vouch for the accuracy). This means that the speed is now much less than 1 sec.

2. When using a technology such as spv mining, the block size ceases to affect the number of orphan blocks. Miners start mining the next block almost immediately after the block appears. However, this increases the number of empty blocks. But I think this is quite a reasonable compromise: reducing the number of orphan blocks at the expense of some increase in empty blocks. Moreover, an empty block, which sometimes appears a few seconds after a non-empty block, does not cause any inconvenience to users.

From all this, we can conclude that, for example, 10 MB. blocks do not pose any threat to network security from orphan-blocks.

Everything is clear with this statement. It works if only one node operator discloses the data. ( and then not always). If we return to your statement again ( and to mine), then "node operators"were used there.

Why did you decide that only ONE node operator will give its data. Where there is one, there are 2, and 3, ... And here everything depends on the number.

Let's take the end users who will not keep the routed nodes. If one end user makes a transaction to another end user, then most likely 2 nodes (the sender node and the recipient node) are enough for the whole world to know about this transaction. And if we take into account that in the future, with a significant development of LN, there will be 98-99% of such end users,then the privacy of LN looks less convincing.

Node A sends a confirmation. This confirmation passes through M1, M2, etc. The Mk node fails. And then the confirmation does not go further. Nodes A, M1, M2, ... Mk-1 will assume that the transaction is completed. After the timeout, the other nodes will assume that the transaction was interrupted.

Your initial statement was :"Nobody can tell you which amounts are forwarded and which aren't, unless node operators make it public.".
 And this is a true statement. From this statement another true statement follows:
 If node operators make their data public, then everything will be bad with privacy in LN.

No one can guarantee that node operators will not do this. You can only believe in it. But, as the English proverb says, "When three know it, all know it".

As far as I understand, there are two options:

1) If node B does not receive confirmation during the timeout period, the transaction is considered incomplete.

2) If node B does not receive a denial during the timeout period, the transaction is considered completed.

Closing channel transactions are not updated simultaneously, but sequentially, node by node.

Let A be the last node that has a closing channel transaction updated. How does node B know that everything ended well and all nodes were updated.

During the transaction through LN, the information is transmitted sequentially. Any participant of the transaction can transfer information only to the previous one or to the next one. This means that all participants cannot simultaneously come to a single decision regarding the transaction status.
For example, let's take the status of a transaction - that it is completed and cannot be canceled. and we have a chain of nodes
A<->M1 <-> M2 <-> ... Mk ... <-> Mn <-> B.
Let node A decide that the transaction is final and passes information about it to node M1. M1 passes M2, etc. the information reaches node B. What happens if the Mk node fails at the time of transmitting this information. Nodes A, M1, ..., Mk-1 will assume that the transaction is completed. And the nodes Mk+1,...Mn,B will remain in uncertainty.

These are theoretical reflections. I don't see a solution to this problem. Therefore, it is interesting to know how this problem is solved in LN.

That is, your confidence that LN is confidential is based only on the assumption that node operators will not transmit transaction data to anyone.

Does anyone believe that messengers are confidential, just because they will not share their information with anyone?

Серьезно? "Продолжает удерживаться"?  Ничего, что на 1 февраля этого года этот самый индекс был 62%.

У меня в утверждении: отношение цены и себестоимости.
В вашем утверждении вы сравниваете цену и сложность. Как бы разные вещи. 

С другой стороны, вы видели в интернете хоть одно заявление: "Я майнер, и я майню в минус".  Ведь это же признаться всему миру, что ты дебил. 

Миф о том, что существуют майнеры, которые майнят в минус, довольно популярен в биткоин-сообществе.  Я не понимаю причин этого явления.  Вы что, серьезно верите в то, что существуют майнеры-дебилы?

График сложности зависит от цены  и  от развития производительности асиков. Поэтому даже если цена падает, то за счет роста производительности асиков сложность может расти.

Себестоимость добычи биткоина почти что напрямую зависит от его цены. Растет цена, растет себестоимость. С каким-то лагом, но растет. Падает цена, то и себестоимость падает, если она становится меньше цены.

I think that in this topic we only consider those changes that will be added with the consent of the entire community.

Spam from miners is a lot of transactions. Therefore, single transactions with 0-fee  are unlikely to be evidence.
In fact, most miners can already set any transaction fee they want. If they want to. And you can't prevent it.
The introduction of a minimum fee does not give them this opportunity. They already have this opportunity.

The second sentence already has an answer to this situation.

Consider the situations:
1. Most miners set a high transaction fee. And they stop taking transactions with a lower fee. Technically, they don't violate protocol. But at the same time they cause inconvenience to users.
2. The system has implemented a minimum fee with adjustment from the block size. Miners start filling blocks to the maximum with useless transactions in order to raise the fee level. Technically, they don't violate protocol. But at the same time they cause inconvenience to users. Increasing the size of the blockchain unnecessarily. Artificially increase the transaction fee.

What is the difference between these situations? Why don't miners do the same as in situation 1? And why would they do as described in situation 2? What is the Bitcoin community's response to the first situation, and what is the response to the second situation?

My answer is this. Miners now have the ability to do malicious actions.The Bitcoin community can adequately respond to such actions of miners. Therefore, miners do not do malicious actions. And they won't.

I don't know where you got this information about miners. Miners have always been in favor of increasing blocks.

Who is against the increase-so this is the team of bitcoin developers.

My suggestion was to introduce a minimum fee in the Bitcoin system. And it is better to introduce such changes at the protocol level. You claim that the disadvantage is that "Need to change Bitcoin protocol to explicitly disallow transaction low fees".

Although this is not entirely true. The minimum fee can be entered at the level of miners, without changing the protocol. If, for example, 95% of miners vote for this and activate this mode, then blocks with transactions with a fee less than the established one will be considered invalid by the rest of the miners. But I emphasize that it is better to introduce such changes at the protocol level.

1. Miners can still fill blocks with their own transactions (spam from miners). But so far, there is no evidence that this happened in reality.

2. Such "spam from miners" is very easy to detect. And the entire Bitcoin community very quickly learns that some miner is engaged in malicious activity.

3. The community has the ability to react to such an event. Most miners should block the "malicious" miner.
If the majority of miners cannot overcome this phenomenon, then the bitcoin community can replace the miners.

4.The mining system is a billion-dollar business, and there is no reason for miners to engage in any malicious activity, because it will cause much more damage than the likely profit.

5.The probability of any malicious activity from miners is very low, practically zero. Therefore, I suggest that we stop discussing any arguments that start with the words "bad, malicious  miners". It's just a waste of time. The same as spending time discussing "Perpetuum mobile".

As far as I understand your principle, you propose to regulate the transaction fee through changing the block size.
I suggest another option: adjust the block size by changing the transaction fee.

Let's say we have a sample computer of the lower segment, and we focus on it when setting constraints.

We can count the parameter:
1. The maximum block size that our sample computer can process in the time we need.

Additionally, we can evaluate one more parameter:
2. We estimate the maximum level of growth of bitcoin, based on the level of technology development that we can afford.
    Based on it, we calculate the parameter: average block size.


I don't know why, but everyone decided that the 2nd parameter must be adjusted through the 1st.
Suppose we have a parameter of 1: 10 MB.
And parameter 2 : 100gb per year. - >the average block size should be ~2mb.
These parameters can be very different.

Algorithm diagram:
1. When switching to a new scheme, the values of parameters 1-2 are set, and the minimum transaction fee is assigned.
2. After 2016 blocks (this value may be different), the recalculation takes place.
If the average size of the resulting blocks is higher than 2mb, the minimum fee increases.
If the average size of the resulting blocks is lower than the parameter 2, the minimum fee is reduced.

The calculation of the average block can be done for the last period, you can calculate for the last few periods.

3. The fee can be changed with a certain step, for example, 10-20%. That is, if the average block has not changed much, then it is better not to change the fee .
4 You can always calculate the maximum fee amount for the next period. Towards the end of the period, it becomes more accurate.
And if you make a transaction at the very end of the period, you can make a fee =maximum (the current fee , the maximum possible for the next period). This should save you from possible problems at the junction of periods.

Advantages:
1. Excellent system response to peak loads. Since there is a margin due to the large size of the maximum block.
2. The percentage of non-occurrence of transactions in the nearest block is sharply reduced and is close to zero.
3. There is no need for dynamic commission calculation. It is enough to get the set amount of commission from the system.
4. the overall growth of the blockchain should not be very different from what we wanted.

Disadvantages: