Are we drawing the handle of the 3-year cup & handle by any chance?

So cup 'n handle breakout brings the $9800 prediction into play now right?

Мне кажется, что аналогия с избирательной кампанией политика не вполне корректна. Похоже, Тонич зря использовал термин "свидетели", если бы назвал их "мастер ноды", было бы меньше эмоций. Мне кажется, выбор пользователем списка witness-нод в своём Байтболл-клиенте скорее можно сравнить с выбором им же своих контрагентов в реальной жизни - с какими банками он работает, с какими поставщиками, в какие магазины ходит, в какие поликлиники и т.д. Он не положит деньги в помоечный банк, и не пойдёт лечить зубы в подворотню. И если он торгует на Poloniex, обменивает на Shapeshift, и читает bits.media и Forklog, то именно их он и укажет в своём списке witness-нод. На избирательную кампанию это мало похоже.

Во втором посте этой темы я перевёл ответы Тонича о свидетелях. Да, теоретически может случиться так, что свидетели сговорятся, и не включат в DAG какую-то транзакцию, или, наоборот, включат даблспендовую. Но теоретически такое может случиться и мастернодами Dash. Однако мир на этом не останавливается, и никто панически не сливает Dash.

Они [свидетели] вынуждены тратить силы на приобретение репутации

Quick question: did you read the white paper?

1. Introduction
Commerce on the Internet has come to rely almost exclusively on financial institutions serving as
trusted third parties to process electronic payments. While the system works well enough for
most transactions, it still suffers from the inherent weaknesses of the trust based model.
Completely non-reversible transactions are not really possible, since financial institutions cannot
avoid mediating disputes. The cost of mediation increases transaction costs, limiting the
minimum practical transaction size and cutting off the possibility for small casual transactions,
and there is a broader cost in the loss of ability to make non-reversible payments for nonreversible
services. With the possibility of reversal, the need for trust spreads. Merchants must
be wary of their customers, hassling them for more information than they would otherwise need.
A certain percentage of fraud is accepted as unavoidable. These costs and payment uncertainties
can be avoided in person by using physical currency, but no mechanism exists to make payments
over a communications channel without a trusted party.
What is needed is an electronic payment system based on cryptographic proof instead of trust,
allowing any two willing parties to transact directly with each other without the need for a trusted
third party. Transactions that are computationally impractical to reverse would protect sellers
from fraud, and routine escrow mechanisms could easily be implemented to protect buyers. In
this paper, we propose a solution to the double-spending problem using a peer-to-peer distributed
timestamp server to generate computational proof of the chronological order of transactions. The
system is secure as long as honest nodes collectively control more CPU power than any
cooperating group of attacker nodes.

6. Incentive
The incentive may help encourage nodes to stay honest. If a greedy attacker is able to
assemble more CPU power than all the honest nodes, he would have to choose between using it
to defraud people by stealing back his payments, or using it to generate new coins. He ought to
find it more profitable to play by the rules, such rules that favour him with more new coins than
everyone else combined, than to undermine the system and the validity of his own wealth.